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THE RELATIONSHIP OF FAMILY AND JUVENILE
COURTS IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
Judge Leonard P. Edwards*
When Harry and Mary Jones separated, their two children,
Tom and Jane, remained with Mary. Harry visited with the chil-
dren regularly. Mary filed for dissolution of their marriage and
asked for exclusive custody of the children. In his answer, Harry
asked for exclusive custody. The dissolution proceedings were bitter
with quarrels over money and the children. The parties were unable
to reach an agreement even after several meetings with a mediator.
The court initiated a custody investigation and each parent started
making allegations against the other. Harry claimed that Mary was
an alcoholic and that she was letting a day-care center raise the chil-
dren. Mary said that Harry used drugs and that his girlfriend cared
for the children whenever visitation took place.
Mary said that after one particular visit with the father, Jane
complained that her "privates" hurt. Jane said Harry touched her
there, and she wished he would stop. Mary took Jane to a therapist
who concluded that Jane had been sexually molested by her father.
The therapist reported her conclusions to the Child Protection
Agency, and an agency investigative worker is now considering filing
a juvenile court dependency petition. Mary also applied to the family
court for termination of Harry's visitation with both children. The
district attorney was consulted and filed criminal charges against
Harry. All of this information was given to the family court custody
evaluator.
Harry denied the allegations and claimed that Mary was pro-
gramming Jane in order to gain an advantage in the dissolution pro-
ceedings. He intends to have an independent therapist examine Jane.
These facts set the scene for a frequently recurring situation in
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the superior courts of California and many other states:' a child
abuse allegation 2 made in the context of a family law proceeding.
This situation raises a series of perplexing questions. Should the
family courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction over the case or refer it
to the juvenile court?4 If each court hears the case, what coordination
is required between the courts? If both courts decide similar issues,
which order should take precedence?
1. Approximately 2-10% of all family court cases involving custody and/or visitation
disputes involve a charge of sexual abuse. Thoennes & Pearson, Summary of Findings from
the Sexual Abuse Allegations Project (Draft), ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY AND CONCILIATION
COURTs RE:SEARCN UNIT (1986) [hereinafter Summary of Findings]. This figure is a sharp
increase from the years before 1980. This conclusion is based upon the summary of findings
and the author's interviews with Family Court Services personnel in California. Moreover it
appears that only a small percentage (8%) of all child abuse reports are demonstrably false.
The large majority of reports are either true or unsubstantiated. Jones, Reliable and Fictitious
Accounts of Sexual Abuse to Children, to be published in the JOURNAL OF INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE (1987).
2. "Child abuse" means a physical injury which is inflicted by other than accidental
means on a child by another person. "Child abuse" also means the sexual abuse of a child or
any act or omission proscribed by Penal Code section 273a (willful cruelty or unjustifiable
punishment of a child) or section 273d (corporal punishment or injury). "Child abuse" also
means the neglect of a child or abuse in out-of-home care, as defined in this article. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11165 (West Supp. 1987).
3. Family court refers to the activities of one or more superior court judge, referee or
commissioner while he is handling litigation arising out of the Family Law Act (CAL. ClV.
CODE §§ 4000-5317 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987)), and the Family Conciliation Court Law
(CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1730-33 (West 1982)). Technically these proceedings are all part
of the general duties of the superior court. In large counties with more than 10-15 judges, the
court often assigns one or more judges to handle all of the cases arising under the Family Law
Act. This is referred to as the family court. It is not a "court" with a special statutory jurisdic-
tion, but is "an ordinary numbered department of a multi-judge court, exercising jurisdiction
over cases divided into classes for convenience of trial and other disposition." 2 WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA PROCEDURE § 172, at 98 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter 2 WITKIN].
In smaller counties, one judge may have all of those responsibilities. In very small coun-
ties (1-2 judges), the work may only take a portion of one judge's day each week.
In some of the larger counties, the superior court has included other types of cases within
the purview of the family court division. Thus, such actions as paternity (Uniform Parentage
Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7000-21 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987)), termination of parental rights
(CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 232-39 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987)), adoption (CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 221-
30.8 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987)), contested guardianships (CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1500-1601
(West 1981)), and civil injunctions involving harassment (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6
(West Supp. 1987)), may be heard in the family court. Such inclusions are a matter of local
court policy and permit certain economies of scale as well as enabling the assigned judges to
develop an expertise in the subject matter. See 2 WITKIN § 172, at 197-98.
4. Juvenile court is any superior court sitting in the exercise of jurisdiction over any
person described in the law relating to children (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 200-22 (West
1984 & Supp. 1987)). The issues addressed in this article are of relevance primarily in depen-
dency cases (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984), not delinquency matters (CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984)) or status offenses (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
601 (West 1984)). Reference to juvenile court throughout this article will refer only to juvenile
court dependency matters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal proceedings arising from child abuse allegations have
risen dramatically in the 1980's.' Legal actions involving child abuse
include criminal prosecutions, petitions filed in juvenile court, and
allegations made by one parent against the other in family law cus-
tody litigation. Consequently, the public agencies which investigate,
petition and supervise child abuse cases have been overwhelmed by
this sharp increase.
There are two principle reasons for the rise. First, the Califor-
nia Legislature passed a mandatory reporting law,' which was
enacted in 1980 and has been strengthened several times by subse-
quent legislation.7 The classes of persons who must report suspected
child abuse have been expanded, the penalties for failing to report
are serious, and civil liability for failing to report has been clearly
established.'
Second, heightened public awareness has also contributed to the
rising level of reported child abuse cases. Child abuse, both physical
and sexual, has been the subject of national television productions, 9
and the media regularly reports child abuse cases. In addition, chil-
dren from pre-school to high school years are now educated in school
about the dangers of child abuse. The Child Abuse Prevention
Training Act of 1984 funded training programs in schools to teach
child abuse prevention techniques."
5. For example, the California Department of Social Services received reports of175,200 child abuse cases in 1980, and 295,769 cases in 1985. Memorandum from Depart-
ment of Social Services to David Foster, Office of Child Abuse Prevention (Dec. 3, 1986).Similarly, on a national level, estimates of sexual abuse cases per thousand children was be-lieved to be 1.87 in 1978, compared to 5.76 per thousand in 1980, 9.0 in 1982, and 15.88 in1984. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, INC., HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFI-
CIAL. NEGI.ECIr AND ABUSE REPORTING (1984) (1986) (American Humane Association, Den-
ver, Colorado). Ten to fifteen percent of all divorce/dissolution cases with children are con-
tested. Two to ten percent of family court cases involve custody/visitation issues with
allegations of sexual abuse. Thus, two to fifteen cases out of each 1000 divorce filings nation-
ally involve allegations of sexual abuse by a parent against a child. Summary of Findings,
supra note 1.
6. CAL.. PENAL. CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1987).
7. Id. at §§ 11166-74.5.
8. See, e.g., Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 552 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
9. 60 Minutes, (CBS television broadcast, Vol. 17, No. 36, Sunday, May 18, 1986),included a segment on sexual abuse allegations between parents. The Burning Bed and Some-
thing About Amelia were two movies shown to a national television audience. In addition, a
number of serialized productions have had episodes on child sexual abuse, including Webster,
L.A. Law, and Hill Street Blues.
10. 1984 Cal. Legis. Serv. 116 (West) (A.B. 2443, M. Waters). See also CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 18950 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
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The sharp increase in these cases has had a dramatic impact on
the legal system. Child abuse allegations have appeared with greater
regularity throughout the courts in a variety of different legal con-
texts." In juvenile court, dependency cases focus upon protection of
the abused child;"S delinquency cases can involve abuse of one child
by another;'" in criminal court, the alleged abuser is prosecuted for
his acts;" in family court, parents can allege child abuse against
each other;"6 and the abused child can bring a civil suit against the
alleged abuser for damages and other relief.' Additionally, a myriad
of statutes has been promulgated addressing some of the problems
raised by cases involving child abuse allegations.'
The same cases with the same parties frequently appear in
more than one court setting simultaneously. The most difficult and
recurring situations arise in the family and juvenile courts.' 8 This
article focuses on the relationship of these concurrent and sometimes
competing actions. The article describes the family and juvenile
courts and the ways in which each deals with child abuse cases. The
author compares the structure and procedures in each court and the
ways in which the same case can move from one to the other or be in
both simultaneously. The article also reviews the case law and stat-
utes which address the relationship of the two courts in abuse cases.
The article concludes that each court was designed for a specific
purpose. Family court was designed to provide litigants with a fo-
rum in which to resolve the issues relating to the custody, care and
control of children. Juvenile court was created to protect children
from parental abuse or neglect. The author suggests that, given the
present structure of the two courts, the child protective agency
worker who is investigating child abuse allegations is in the best
position to decide whether the juvenile court should intervene in
11. See supra note 2.
12. See, e.g., In re Courtney S., 130 Cal. App. 3d 567, 181 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1982); CAL.
WEI.F. & INST. CODE § 300(a), (d) (West Supp. 1987).
13. CAl.. WEtF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984); In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464
P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970).
14. CAl.. PENAL. CODE §§ 999g-u (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); People v. Roscoe, 168
Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 359 P.2d 433,
11 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1955).
15. See, e.g., In re William T., 172 Cal. App. 3d 790, 218 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1985).
16. Landeros, 17 Cal. 3d at 399, 551 P.2d at 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
17. E.g., CAt.. CIV. CODE § 4608(b) (West Supp. 1987); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 240(c),
1228 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350 (West 1984), § 356.5 (West Supp.
1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 999q, 868.5, 868.6, 868.8, 1347 (West Supp. 1987).
18. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeter-
minacy, 39 LAW & CONrEMP. PROS. Summer 1975, at 226.
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pending family law custody litigation. This determination should be
made at the earliest possible time. The article also concludes that
adherence to established guidelines would allow both courts to man-
age child abuse cases more effectively and efficiently.
II. COMPARISON OF FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT
A. The Functions of Family and Juvenile Courts
Family and juvenile courts were created for different reasons.
Family court primarily provides a private dispute settlement function
for its participants" while juvenile court involves application of the
court's child protection function.2" Both courts involve family and
child custody issues, but family court is designed to provide a forum
in which litigants can resolve the issues relating to their marriage or
other relationship which resulted in the birth of a child. Parents are
presumed to be capable of making decisions regarding their children
without state intervention or oversight."' When parents cannot re-
solve child custody differences the court must decide these issues
under state guidelines.22 Other interested parties may also assert
rights regarding access to the child."3
In the family court forum, the state minimally intrudes into the
custody decision making process. The government has an interest in
the outcome, and has established a number of rules that the court
must employ in deciding child custody issues.24 These rules are
based principally upon policies established by the Legislature to pro-
mote the best interests of the child and to preserve parental sharing
of rights and responsibilities."'
Juvenile court was also created to protect children and to pre-
19. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.1 (West Supp. 1987).
20. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1987).
21. The court in In re Jennifer P., stated that "our system, for better or worse,
presumes that parents are the best judges of their children's best interests." 174 Cal. App. 3d
322, 327, 219 Cal. Rptr. 909, 912 (1985). See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600.1 (West Supp. 1987).
See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). "So fundamental are the rights of parenthood
that infringements thereof have been held to constitute an encroachment on the personal liberty
of the parent forbidden by the Constitution." 39 AM. JUR. Parent and Child § 6 (1942).
22. The guidelines are set out in Civil Code sections 4600 (a) and (b), 4600.5 (a), (b),
(c) and (f), 4601, 4601.5, 4607, and 4608.
23. CAt.. Civ. CODE § 4601 (West 1983). See also id. at §§ 197.5, 4351.5 (regarding
grandparent visitation).
24. See supra note 22.
25. See Courtney S., 130 Cal. App. 3d at 567, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 843; CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 300(a), (d) (West Supp. 1987).
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serve and strengthen the child's family ties.26 However, in juvenile
court, the state takes formal action to restrict parental behavior
regarding children,"7 to provide services to children and their fami-
lies,"8 and, if necessary, to remove children from the custody of their
parents or guardians. 9 The state takes an assertive role in the juve-
nile court. The government is a party to the proceedings, seeking to
prove that a child needs protection because of some action or inaction
by the parents.30 The state may ask for removal of a child from pa-
rental custody or control and then propose a plan for reuniting the
child with the parent. If the plan is not successfully completed, the
child will not be returned to a parent and the state will seek a per-
manent home for the child in another setting."1
Both the family and juvenile courts perform more than the pri-
mary function ascribed to them. The family court is often called
upon to make protective orders relating to the child or one of the
parents. The juvenile court often makes custody orders regulating
parental powers with respect to the child, including issues of access
and time sharing. 2
B. Perspective of the Two Courts
1. Family Court
In family law the parents are presumed to be fit and proper
persons to care for their child. 8 The family court process permits
parents to determine how they will share the responsibilities of rais-
ing the child, including issues such as school, medical treatment,
religious upbringing, allocated time with the child, and financial
26. Welfare and Institutions Code section 202 provides, in part, that "[mlinors under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court who are in need of protective services shall receive care,
treatment and guidance consistent with their best interests and the best interest of the public."
CAL. WEtF. & INST. CODE § 202(b) (West Supp. 1987).
The court in In re A. J., 274 Cal. App. 2d 199, 202, 78 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882 (1969),
stated that, "Uluvenile court law is designed not primarily for the reproof and improvement of
erring parents; its purpose is to provide protection, guidance and discipline to children who, for
reasons mentioned in the statute, may become dependents of the juvenile court acting in loco
parentis." Id.
27. See CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West Supp. 1987).
28. See id. at § 362(c).
29. Id. at § 202(a).
30. Id. at §§ 306, 309, 311 (West 1984).
31. Id. at §§ 360-62, 366, 366.2, 366.25 (West Supp. 1987).
32. E.g., In re Brendan P., 184 Cal. App. 3d 910, 230 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1986); In re
William T., 172 Cal. App. 3d 790, 281 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1985). See infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
33. See CAt.. CiV. CODE § 4600.1 (West Supp. 1987); see also supra note 21.
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contributions.34
The Legislature and courts prefer that parents decide these is-
sues without state involvement.3 5 Unless parental child rearing falls
below a minimal societal standard, the state should not intervene in
the parents' decision making process."6 In marital dissolution pro-
ceedings, most parents reach an agreement on child custody issues
without going through contested hearings and then submit the agree-
ment to the court for judgment. The state does not ordinarily
supervise or interfere with family decisions during the marriage. The
Legislature has concluded that the court must affirm the agreement
reached by the parents at the time of marital dissolution or modifica-
tion absent "exceptional circumstances." '
If custody issues are contested, the state has greater control over
the decision making process. Recognizing that custody disputes may
create special problems for the parents and the child, the Legislature
has established a number of rules and guidelines that govern the
child custody determination process." Parents must participate in
mediation"' and are encouraged to share the rights and responsibili-
ties of child rearing.' Child custody determinations are based upon
the best interests of the child and require an examination of such
factors as the health, safety and welfare of the child, any history of
abuse against the child, and the nature and amount of contact with
both parents.41 The Legislature also provided that other significant
persons in the child's life have a right of access to her.'2
The state's position of minimal intervention into parental cus-
tody agreements leads to several problems. What if the parents agree
to something that a court finds is not in the best interests of the
child? For example, the parents might agree that one parent will not
34. CAL. CIV. COo §§ 4600.1, 4600.5 (West Supp. 1987).
35. Id. at §§ 4600.1, 4728.
36. Id. at § 4600.1(b).
37. The text of Civil Code section 4600.1(b) provides:
If the parties have agreed to or reached an understanding on the custody or
temporary custody of their children, a copy of the agreement or an affidavit as to
their understanding shall be attached to the petition or action as promptly as
possible after this filing. The court shall, except in exceptional circumstances,
enter an order awarding temporary custody in accordance with the agreement or
understanding, or in accordance with any stipulation of the parties.
Id. at § 4600.1(b).
38. Id. at §§ 4600, 4600.5, 4608.
39. Id. at § 4607.
40. Id. at § 4600.
41. Id. at § 4608.
42. Id. at §§ 4351.5, 4602. Neither of these legislative mandates applies to the intact
marriage, only to parties who are dissolving their marriage.
19871
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pay child support, or that the child will move from one parent to the
other every day, or that one parent will never have contact with the
child. Should the court permit such an agreement?4 s
Married parents who separate and enter into private agree-
ments avoid court involvement. Since there is no occasion for the
court to become involved in these private agreement situations, there
is no interference in the private decision making process. During the
dissolution process, however, courts may learn of such agreements
and may refuse to confirm them."" In some of these situations, the
court acts as a voice for the child. The court may insist that a parent
pay child support and may question the parents about the wisdom of
a particular agreement. Sometimes the court will approve the agree-
ment because it has no means to supervise or enforce orders with
which neither parent is willing to comply.' 5
While family court judges may occasionally detect a custody
stipulation that is contrary to the child's best interests and refuse to
approve it, they are not equipped to do this systematically. Even if
courts intervene, family court judges may be limited to the force of
their persuasion in the court setting because they do not have author-
ity to monitor cases which leave the family court. If both parents
oppose the court's suggestion, neither parent is likely to bring viola-
tions to the court's attention."6
In short, the family court is poorly equipped to speak for or
protect the child. The presumption of parental fitness means the
court need not and should not be concerned with the child. The court
assumes the parents will see to the child's needs."7
2. Juvenile Court
In juvenile court the proceedings focus upon whether the minor
is or might be a dependent child of the court. Dependency denotes
the status of a minor who has been abused, neglected, inadequately
cared for or who is physically dangerous to the public because of a
mental or physical deficiency or disorder.' 8 Section 300 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code sets out the conditions which may result
43. These may be considered "exceptional circumstances" referred to in Civil Code sec-
tion 4600.1 (b).
44. CAL.. CIV. CODE § 4600.1(b) (West Supp. 1987).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 173-214, discussing supervision of court orders.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 21.
48. See infra note 49.
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in the court's intervention on behalf of the minor.49 If the minor is
not found to be a person described by the code, the juvenile court
does not have jurisdiction over him.
In juvenile court the petition focuses upon the conditions to
which the child was allegedly subjected. The issue of the parents'
ability to protect and provide for the child is central to the proceed-
49. Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 provides:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the follow-
ing descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the'juvenile court which may ad-
judge that person to be a dependent child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has
no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capa-
ble of exercising care or control, or has no parent, guardian or custodian actu-
ally exercising care or control.
(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of life, or
who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode, except that no
person may be adjudged a dependent child solely due to the lack of an emer-
gency shelter for the family.
(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physi-
cal deficiency, disorder, or abnormality.
(d) Whose home is an unfit place for him or her by reason of neglect,
cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse of either his or her parents, or his or her
guardian or other person in whose custody or care he or she is.
(e) Who is under the age of three and whose home is an unfit place for him
or her as a result of severe physical abuse of the minor by a parent, or by any
person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have
known that that person was physically abusing the minor. For the purpose of
this section, "severe physical abuse" means any of the following: any single act
of abuse which causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if left un-
treated, it would cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical
disability, or death; any single act of sexual abuse which causes significant
bleeding, deep bruising, or significant external or internal swelling; or more
than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising,
significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness.
(f) Who has been freed for adoption from one or both parents for 12
months by either relinquishment or termination of parental rights and for whom
an interlocutory decree has not been granted pursuant to Section 224n of the
Civil Code or an adoption petition has not been granted.
(g) It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting the amendments to
subdivision (a) enacted at the 1985-86 Regular Session, to assure that courts, in
making a determination pursuant to subdivision (a) shall not focus upon the fact
that a parent has a physical disability. The Legislature declares that a physical
disability, such as blindness or deafness, is no bar to the raising of happy and
well-adjusted children and that a court's determination pursuant to subdivision
(a) should center upon whether a parent's disability prevents him or her from
exercising care and control.
CAL.. WELF. & INSTn. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1987). For purposes of this article, subsections(a) and (d) are of particular interest since child abuse allegations are charged under these
sections. Subsequent reference to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 actions will be to
those subsections.
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ings.50 In each case referred to the dependency system, the threshold
issue is whether the child is being abused or neglected."' The next
issue is whether either parent is able to adequately care for and pro-
tect the child.5"
Since both family and juvenile courts may have the same fami-
lies appearing before them in cases involving alleged child abuse, it is
essential to examine the differences between the two court systems.
The next section of this article will discuss the critical differences
between the juvenile and family courts as they relate to cases in
which child abuse allegations have been made.
III. A COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF FAMILY AND JUVENILE
COURT TREATMENT OF CHILD ABUSE CASES
While there are numerous differences between the substantive
and procedural law of the family and juvenile courts, this section
will focus upon those differences which might be of significance in a
case involving child abuse allegations. The topics to be covered in-
clude the initiation of legal proceedings, the time frame for litigation,
the parties and attorneys, evidence and procedures, agencies support-
ing the courts, powers of the courts and supervision and enforcement
of orders.
A. Initiation of Legal Proceedings
1. Family Court
In family court, litigation is voluntarily initiated by one of the
parents in the form of a petition for either dissolution of marriage, 53
legal separation, nullity, declaration of paternity, 54 or other ancillary
action related to the petition. 5 If neither parent initiates legal pro-
ceedings, no legal action will take place. Thus, if a parent seeking
relief has insufficient funds, energy or resourcefulness, the legal ac-
tion may never be filed.
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 202.
52. If it is not proven that both parents are unable to adequately care for and protect the
minor, there will be no juvenile court intervention.
53. CA.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4503 (West 1983).
54. CAi.. Civ. CoPY § 7006 (West Supp. 1987).
55. See, e.g., id. at § 4600.5(i), which allows for modification of a joint custody order in
family court upon petition by one or both of the parents, or on the court's own motion.
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2. Juvenile Court
In juvenile court the state initiates the legal proceedings by fil-
ing a petition to bring the minor within the description of the
juvenile court law.5" The filing usually follows an investigation un-
dertaken by a child protective agency 57 which finds that formal ac-
tion is necessary. Both parents may resist the filing."' Conversely,
one or both parents may support the petition believing that state in-
volvement will be beneficial for the child.
The decision to file a petition in juvenile court rests initially
with the investigating probation officer or social services worker.5 9
The investigator must consider whether the child has been abused or
neglected and whether either parent is able and willing to protect
and provide for the child pursuant to society's minimum social
standards.60
In cases involving suspected child abuse, the investigator must
determine if the child's caretaker took the steps a reasonable person
would take under the circumstances. 1 Such steps might include sep-
arating the child from the abuser, securing protective court orders to
insure no further contact, cooperating with any criminal prosecution
against the perpetrator and arranging for counseling to assist the
child in recovering from any trauma suffered. 2
If the investigator finds that the parent's response is insufficient
to protect the child, a petition will be filed on behalf of the child."
On the other hand, if the investigator concludes that the custodial
parent did take sufficient steps to protect the child, he may choose
not to initiate proceedings.
The investigator and parent may alternatively agree that the
child 'will be placed under informal state supervision for a specified
period not to exceed six months." The contract usually involves pro-
viding welfare agency services in return for the parents' agreement to
56. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 311 (West 1984), § 332 (West Supp. 1987).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165(k) (West Supp. 1987).
58. An example of this is In re Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 178 Cal. Rptr. 694
(1981). An example of one parent supporting the petition and one parent resisting is In re
William T., 172 Cal. App. 3d at 790, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 420, which is discussed in detail infra
notes 354-86 and accompanying text.
59. CA.L. WELF. & INST. CODE § 311 (West 1984).
60. See supra notes 2 & 49.
61. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 307.5, 309, 328 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
62. See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text discussing In re Jennifer P.
63. CAl.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 309 (West 1984).
64. Id. at §§ 330, 16506 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. R. CT. 1307(d) (West 1987).
1987]
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follow a suggested program regarding the child.65 Such services are
referred to as family maintenance services 6 and can be either or-
dered by the court after a finding of dependency, or can be accepted
voluntarily by families who need them. These voluntary agreements
often are reached only after the parent is made aware that failure to
agree to the suggested terms may result in more severe corrective
intervention, including removal of the child.
67
The impetus to engage the dependency process sometimes does
not originate with the police or a child protective agency worker. A
parent or interested party may ask the probation officer to commence
proceedings in the juvenile court.6" If the investigating agency does
not take formal action and file a petition, any parent or interested
party may petition the superior court and request court-ordered in-
tervention. 69 Once the court receives such a petition, it may affirm
the probation officer's decision or order him to commence juvenile
court proceedings.70
B. Time Frame for Litigation
1. Family Court
The time frame for the resolution of issues in the two courts is
strikingly different. The parties may never choose to commence pro-
ceedings in family court. They can privately struggle over custody
issues indefinitely. They can privately order their child rearing re-
sponsibilities or reach an agreement and submit it for the court's
signature with reasonable confidence that there will be no investiga-
tion or interference.7 If the parents choose to resort to the court
process, they will have to abide by the court rules. Child custody
issues which are contested can be heard in family court. They will
receive preference over all other civil cases except those to which spe-
65. CAl.. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 330, 16506 (West Supp. 1987).
66. Id. at §§ 16506, 16506.1 (West Supp. 1987). They can be offered for six months
and can be extended for a six month period. CAL. R. CT. 1307(d)(3) (West 1987).
67. Parents who do not comply with the directions of a child protective agency investiga-
tion risk the possibility their child will be removed from their custody and formal proceedings
will be commenced. CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 309 (West 1984).
68. Id. at § 329.
69. Id. at § 331.
70. Id. at §§ 329, 331; CAL. R. CT. 1308(e) (West 1987). Welfare and Institutions
Code section 331 does not establish a time period within which the juvenile court judge must
respond to the application for review. The statute should provide that the court respond within
a reasonable time and in no event later than 30 days from the filing. In this way, the family
court and the parties will have a timely response and be able to plan their course of action.
71. CAl.. CIv. CODE § 4600.1(b) (West Supp. 1987).
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cial preference is given by law.72
In contested custody disputes, the family court can act immedi-
ately, upon an ex parte basis by issuing temporary orders relating to
the custody." Most courts will not change the child's living patterns
pending trial but will attempt to preserve the familial status quo.7 4
Hearings on custody issues can take place a few weeks after the fil-
ing of moving papers, although the parties must first complete
mediation before a contested custody hearing can be held.78 The time
required to complete mediation varies from county to county and de-
pends upon the availability of mediators, the number of mediation
sessions available and the cooperation of the parties.7 After the com-
pletion of mediation, a contested custody issue can be scheduled for
hearing. Even with preferential calendaring, the case may not be
heard for months after the court's initial ruling. Once a court order
is issued, it will remain in effect unless modified until the child
reaches eighteen, is emancipated or dies, whichever occurs first.7
2. Juvenile Court
In juvenile court there are strict time limits for all dependency
hearings. The Legislature imposed these limits to insure that depen-
dency cases will be heard as quickly as possible because of the
importance of the issues.7 8 Removal from parents and placement
with a non-parent requires the fastest course of action. If the child is
taken from a parent, a petition must be filed within 48 hours (ex-
cluding weekends and holidays).7 ' A detention hearing" must be
72. Id. at § 4600.6.
73. Id. at §§ 4600.1, 4603 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
74. "[Rlegardless of how custody was originally decided upon, after the child has lived
in one parent's home for a significant period, it surely remains 'undesireable' to uproot him
from his 'established mode of living,' and a substantial change in his circumstances should
ordinarily be disapproved." In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 731 n.4, 598 P.2d 36,
38 n.4, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 n.4 (1979). See also Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 535,
724 P.2d 486, 489, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (1986). SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT RULFS 17B2b(l)(a).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1987).
76. The mediation process can take anywhere from a few weeks to several months. This
is based upon the author's discussion with family court services directors in California.
77. The order cannot be modified absent an agreement of the parties or a court order
based upon a substantial change in the parties' circumstances. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600.1(b),
4603 (West Supp. 1987). See also In re Carrie W., 78 Cal. App. 3d 866, 144 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1978).
78. A child custody order will lose its effect when the subject child is no longer a child.
If there is no removal, the jurisdictional hearing must be set within 30 days of the filing of the
petition. CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 334 (West 1984); CAL. R. CT. 1361(a) (West 1987).
79. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 313 (West 1984).
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held within 24 hours of the filing of a petition."'
The jurisdictional hearing 2 must be held within 15 court days"
of the detention hearing, and a dispositional hearing8 4 must be held
within 10 court days of that time.85 Continuances are permitted only
under very strict guidelines thereafter."' Under no circumstances
may the dispositional hearing be held more than six months after the
detention hearing. Thereafter, review hearings8 8  must be held
within six months of the dispositional hearing or previous review.89
If the child is in out-of-home placement, a permanency planning
hearing90 must be held within one year or eighteen months from the
dispositional hearing." Juvenile court cases involving allegations of
dependency receive preferential calendaring over all other cases.92
The strict time limits outlined above do not apply when a child
is placed with one parent on the condition that the other parent have
no contact with the child.' 3 Usually, a parent or child protective
agency learns of suspected child abuse by the other parent. An
80. At the detention hearing the court determines whether the child shall be returned to
the care of a parent or whether out-of-home placement pending trial is necessary. The grounds
for detention are listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 319 and California Rules of
Court rule 1337.
81. CAl.. WEi.F. & INST. CODE § 319 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. R. CT. 1336, 1337
(West 1987).
82. The jurisdictional hearing is the trial or adjudication hearing at which the court
determines whether the allegations in the petition are true and whether the child is a depen-
dent child of the court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 355, 356 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987);
CAI.. R. Ca . 1364, 1365 (West 1987).
83. CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 334 (West 1984); CAL. R. C'. 1361(b) (West 1987).
84. At the dispositional hearing, the court decides what is to be done with the child as a
result of jurisdiction having been established. The options available to the court include dis-
missing the petition, returning the child to a parent on a period of supervision, or removing the
child from both parents and placing him in a relative or foster home or in a private institu-
tional setting. CAL.. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 360, 361.2, 390 (West. 1984 & Supp. 1987);
CAL.. R. Cr. 1376, 1377 (West 1987).
85. CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358 (West Supp. 1987).
86. Id. at § 352(a), (b). For example, there should be no continuances granted such that
the dispositional hearing would be held more than 60 days after the detention hearing absent a
finding of exceptional circumstances. Id. at § 352(b).
87. Id. at § 352(b). Note that there is a different time frame for out-of-custody filings.
88. At a review hearing the court must determine whether the child must remain a
dependent child of the court. The court also determines the extent of compliance with the case
plan, the progress of the parents in overcoming the conditions which resulted in dependency,
and the data by which a permanent plan for the child shall be set. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 366 (West Supp. 1987); CAt.. R. CT. 1378 (West 1987).
89. CAL.. WE F. & INsa . CODE §§ 366(a), 366.2(a) (West Supp. 1987).
90. Id. at § 366.25.
91. Id. at § 366.25(a).
92. Id. at § 345.
93. See CAL.. WFLF. & INST. CODE § 16507 (West Supp. 1987).
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investigating officer for the child protective agency will inform the
reporting parent that the child may remain in his or her custody
only if the parent suspected of abuse has no contact or only super-
vised contact with the child. The investigator may threaten to remove
the child and place him in protective custody if that condition is
violated.
If no petition is filed, the parent suspected of abuse may be una-
ble to visit indefinitely, absent a court determination of the truth of
the abuse allegation and the necessity for the no visitation rule. It is
preferable to permit either parent to insist upon initiation of formal
proceedings to test the investigator's determination in court. The
same time lines should be followed as in a parental removal situation
although some relaxation could be permitted since the child is with a
parent and not in an out-of-home setting.9 4
94. Id. See In re Dolly A., 177 Cal. App. 3d 195, 222 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1986); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CoDE, § 366(a) (West Supp. 1987). Section 387 provides:
An order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor
from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing
placement in a foster home, or commitment to a private or county institution,
shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.
(a) The supplemental petition shall be filed by the probation officer in the
original matter and shall contain a concise statement of facts sufficient to sup-
port the conclusion that the previous disposition has not been effective in the
rehabilitation or protection of the minor.
(b) Upon the filing of the supplemental petition, the clerk of the juvenile
court shall immediately set the same for hearing within 30 days, and the proba-
tion officer shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the persons and in the
manner prescribed by Sections 335 and 337.
(c) An order for the detention of the minor pending adjudication of the
petition may be made only after a hearing is conducted pursuant to Article 7
(commencing with Section 305).
Id. at § 387. Section 388 provides:
Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a depen-
dent child of the juvenile court or the child himself through a properly
appointed guardian may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evi-
dence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a
dependent child of the juvenile court for a hearing to change, modify, or set
aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the
court. The petition shall be verified and, if made by a person other than the
child, shall state the petitioner's relationship to or interest in the child and shall
set forth in concise language any change of circumstance or new evidence which
are alleged to require such change of order or termination of jurisdiction.
If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the
proposed change of order or termination of jurisdiction, the court shall order
that a hearing be held and shall give prior notice, or cause prior notice to be
given, to such persons and by such means as prescribed by Section 386, and, in
such instances as the means of giving notice is not prescribed by such sections,
then by such means as the court prescribes.
Id. at § 388 (West 1984). See also Ansley v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 477, 229 Cal.
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This time frame represents a balance between the parent's
rights to show they can be rehabilitated, complete the reunification
plan and regain custody of the child, and the need of the child to
have a stable, safe, permanent home within a reasonable time. 5 Ju-
venile court intervention is normally restricted to the time it takes to
reunify the family or permanently place the minor. In most cases the
court decides whether the child will be permanently placed away
from the parents within two years, and most cases are dismissed
within three years."6
C. Parties and Attorneys
1. Family Court
The number of parties in each setting is a reflection of the dif-
ferences between the two courts. In family court there are two
parties: the parents. Whether the child should be a party has been
discussed by some commentators,'97 but the authority for such status
is questionable." Under the Family Law Act grandparents and step-
parents can achieve party status on the issue of visitation."
In family court, each party may have an attorney, and, in
addition, the court may appoint an attorney for the child.'00 Ap-
pointment of an attorney for the child has increased in frequency in
recent years due in part to the increased number of contested custody
cases involving child abuse allegations. 0 ' Parents must pay for their
Rptr. 771 (1986).
95. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Stan-
dards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in
Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 683 (1976); see
also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/ABA, BALLINGER, JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (tentative draft)
(1977).
96. This is the intent of the law and general experience of the author in practice. See
generally CAL. WEt.F. & INsT. CODE §§ 366, 366.25, 366.3 (West Supp. 1987).
97. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Re-
maining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody & Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 978 (1977).
98. There is no statutory authority for such a declaration, but it is sometimes permitted
in practice.
99. CAI.. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(a), (b) (West Supp. 1987).
100. Id. at § 4606.
101. See Edwards, A Proposal for the Appointment of Attorneys for Children in Mari-
tal Dissolution Cases, 8 FAM. L. NEWS 34 (1985); see also Moffat v. Moffat, 27 Cal. 3d 645,
612 P.2d 967, 165 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1980); see generally CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRAC-
TICE § 23:21, at 244 (CEB) (1981).
Several cases have stated that children are parties (or real parties in interest) in those
family law cases involving actions where the children are the direct beneficiaries of a support
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own attorneys in family court and for the child's attorney if one is
appointed. 10 2 Some parents cannot afford an attorney and free legal
services are generally not available. 03 Thus, an indigent parent may
have to face family court litigation without an attorney.
2. Juvenile Court
In juvenile court, in addition to the parents, both the child and
the state are parties.'0 4 The state is the petitioner, the agency with
the authority to investigate and file a petition if warranted. 5 More-
over, guardians, foster parents, relatives, de facto parents and other
interested persons may gain party status or at least have an opportu-
nity to address the court at some or all of the hearings.' 6
In juvenile court, all parties have the right to an attorney.10 7
The parents"0 s and the child' 09 may have attorneys appointed for
decree which is being enforced or modified. See, e.g., Metson v. Metson, 56 Cal. App. 2d 328,
132 P.2d 513 (1943); Allen v. Allen, 138 Cal. App. 2d 706, 292 P.2d 581 (1956); Evans v.
Evans, 185 Cal. App. 2d 566, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1960); In re Marriage of Utigard, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 133, 178 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1981).
It has also been suggested that the state, as represented by the court, is in fact a party to
the dissolution proceeding in two capacities: (1) to assure that the attempt to dissolve the mar-
riage is free of fraud, collusion and imposition (Rehfuss v. Rehfuss, 169 Cal. 86, 145 P. 1020
(1915)); and (2) in its interest in the welfare and maintenance of the children (Metson, 56 Cal.
App. 2d 328, 132 P.2d 513 (1943)).
102. CAL.. CIv. CODE § 4606 (West Supp. 1987).
103. Legal services for indigent citizens in marital cases have been cut back drastically
over the past 10 years. In Santa Clara County, legal services will not represent parents in
custody cases except in extraordinary circumstances.
104. CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318 (West Supp. 1987); see also In re Patricia E.,
174 Cal. App. 3d 1, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1985).
105. CA.. R. CT. 1307(0 (West 1987).
106. CAl.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 349 (West 1984); CAL. R. CT. 1311(b)(2)(a) (West
1987). See, e.g., Charles S. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 151, 214 Cal. Rptr. 47
(1985). It is interesting, however, that Welfare and Institutions Code section 345, as amended
in 1986, states in part: "Inlo person on trial, awaiting trial or under accusation of crime, other
than a parent, guardian, or relative of the minor, shall be permitted to be present at any
session, except as a witness," making the issue of stepparents as parties somewhat precarious.
On the status of foster parents, see Brown v. County of San Juaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
Cal. 1985); CAt.. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.25(g), 362(b) (West Supp. 1987); and In re
Christina K., 184 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 229 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1987).
107. CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 317-18 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
108. Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 317-18 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987). If the minor is
alleged to come within the provisions and description of section 300(d), the court shall appoint
counsel to represent him. Id. at § 318(a). The minor has the right to effective assistance of
counsel. In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1054-55, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199-200
(1986). Whether the parents have the right to the effective assistance of counsel is a matter of
controversy. Compare In re Ammanda G., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 231 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1986)
with In re Christina H., 182 Cal. App. 3d 47, 227 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1986). See also CAL. R. CT.
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them if they are indigent. The state or petitioning party is also rep-
resented by an attorney, usually a county or city attorney." 0 There
is no provision for the appointment of attorneys for foster parents,
relatives or guardians. In addition to attorneys, there may also be a
guardian ad litem"' or child advocate"' or both appearing on behalf
of the child.' If a parent is not competent, he may have a guardian
ad litem appointed to represent his best interests." 4
D. Evidence and Procedures
The evidentiary and procedural rules applicable in the two
courts are dramatically different. It is easier to have evidence of
abuse admitted in a juvenile dependency proceeding than in a family
court trial. Additionally, the needs of the child are addressed with
more sensitivity by the evidentiary and procedural rules employed in
juvenile court than they are in the family court setting.
1. Investigatory Report
An important step in the decision making process in each court
is the creation of an investigatory report to assist the court in its
decision. The principle difference between the two courts relates to
1134(c) (West 1987).
The minor may have the right to choose her counsel. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
349 (West 1984); Akkiko M. v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 525, 209 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1985); and In re Ann S., 137 Cal. App. 3d 148, 188 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1982).
110. Case law has defined the situations in which one attorney can represent more than
one party. Because of actual or potential conflicts of interest, one attorney often cannot re-
present both parents or represent the petitioner and child. In re Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d
1, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1985). Thus, it is not uncommon for a case to have four attorneys, one
for each parent, one for the child, and one for the county. With any additional parties the
courtroom quickly fills with participants. Moreover, the minor has the right to the assistance
of counsel. See In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1986). Whether
the parents have the right to the effective assistance of counsel is a matter of controversy in the
appellate courts. Compare In re Ammanda G., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 231 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1986) with In re Christina H., 182 Cal. App. 3d 47, 221 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1986). See also CAL.
R. CT. 1334(c) (West 1986).
The minor may have the right to choose her counsel. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
349 (West 1984); Akkiko M. v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 525, 209 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1985); In re Ann S., 137 Cal. App. 3d 148, 188 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1982).
111. CAt.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 326 (West Supp. 1987).
112. Id. at § 358(b).
113. As a result of the presence of an attorney and a guardian ad litem in juvenile court,
the child's interests are asserted by one and perhaps two participants in the legal process.
There is no similar guarantee in the family court. While one or both parents may speak for
the child, if the parents are caught up in their own struggle, the child's interests may be
ignored or neglected.
114. In re Lisa M., 177 Cal. App. 3d 915, 225 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1986).
1987] COURTS AND CHILD ABUSE
the admissibility of the content of the report.
a. Family Court
Pursuant to Civil Code section 4602, a custody investigation re-
port and recommendation may be prepared and submitted to the
court at trial. 1 That report may contain hearsay evidence."' The
Civil Code provides that the court may consider this report but may
not admit it into evidence absent stipulation by the parties." 7 Hear-
say evidence can be stricken from the report on motion by either
party. 
8
b. Juvenile Court
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 280 and Cal-
ifornia Rules of Court 1376(b), a social report is prepared for each
dependency hearing." 9 That report contains the facts gathered by
the preparer of the report, a social worker or probation officer, in-
cluding statements from other persons. California courts have held
that this report is admissible as part of the petitioner's case-in-chief
if the report preparer (author) is present for cross-examination. 20
Unlike the investigatory report in family court, hearsay evidence
contained in the social report is admissible.'" This rule has been
sharply criticized.' 2
115. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4602 (West Supp. 1987).
116. Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 407, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1965) (decided before the
enactment of Civil Code section 4602).
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4602 (West Supp. 1987).
118. In re Marriage of Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 98 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971). See also
Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943).
119. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 280 (West 1984); CAL. R. CT. 1376(b) (West 1987).
120. In re Biggs, 17 Cal. App. 3d 337, 94 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1971); CAL. R. CT. 1365(d)
(West 1986).
121. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 280 (West 1984); CAL. R. CT. 1376(b) (West
1986).
122. By resort to the social report, it is possible for the preparer to include statements
that would not otherwise be admissible. Three recent cases have addressed this issue with two
concluding that the practice was improper. All three were ordered depublished. In re Amanda
I., (3 Civ. 23918), 212 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1985) (depublished); In re Estrella R., (6 Civ.
A026681), 213 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1985) (depublished); In re Lois P., (1 Civ. A029505), 221 Cal.
Rptr. 268 (1985) (depublished).
Whether the social report should be admissible at the jurisdictional hearing places two
important policies in conflict: 1) the policy that only reliable evidence be the basis for legal
decisions; and 2) the policy that the trier of fact should be given all relevant information about
a child protection issue even if it does not satisfy normal evidentiary standards. The appellate
courts have decided that the latter should take precedence. This is the preferable position.
First, it is important for the court to hear everything that the investigator has found relating to
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2. Testimony of the Child
Children may appear as witnesses in either court. They are af-
forded less legal protection against exposure to the tensions of the
court process in family court than in juvenile court.
a. Family Court
While there is no statute restricting testimony of the child, most
family courts are reluctant to have a child testify in court in front of
his parents."' 3 First, such testimony may not be necessary. The
child's statement may have been recorded in the custody evaluation
report or summarized in the testimony of an expert.
Secondly, the litigants may prefer to have the child speak to the
judge in his chambers. This can be done with or without attorneys
or a court reporter and with any special rules to which the court and
parties may agree.124 However, a problem arises when the child
gives unfavorable testimony regarding one parent. That parent may
insist that she be present when the testimony is given and have the
opportunity to cross-examine the child. While there are procedures
in other legal settings that permit the judge, upon proper showing, to
receive testimony out of the presence of the parent or parents, 25 no
such provision exists in the family court setting. Thus, the court may
be forced to choose between learning important information from the
child and exposing the child to a potentially traumatic situation in
which a parent confronts her about the testimony.120
the dependency petition. Only in that way will the court have a complete picture of the child's
situation. Secondly, trial judges are presumed to have the ability to distinguish between differ-
ent types of evidence. Trial judges are trained to judge the weight that a piece of evidence
should be given. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 701 (West 1984).
123. This reluctance has led to the practice of having the child testify in chambers. See
Marriage of Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1100, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (1986); In re
Volkland, 74 Cal. App. 3d 674, 678, 141 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627 (1977); Stuart v. Stuart, 209
Cal. App. 2d 478, 481, 25 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894 (1962); Morris v. Morris, 121 Cal. App. 2d
707, 709, 264 P.2d 106, 107 (1953); Kelly v. Kelly, 75 Cal. App. 2d 408, 413, 171 P.2d 95, 98
(1946). See also Newman & Collester, Children Should Be Seen and Heard: Techniques for
Interviewing the Child in Contested Custody Proceedings, 3 FAM. ADVOC. 8, 10 (1984).
124. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(b) (West Supp. 1987), § 234 (West 1984) (free-
dom from parental custody and control); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350 (West Supp. 1987)
(dependency hearings).
126. For an example of a court which failed to secure a stipulation from the parents
concerning an in-chambers hearing with the child, see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 125 Cal. App. 2d
109, 269 P.2d 908 (1958).
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b. Juvenile Court
Children are sometimes witnesses in juvenile court dependency
proceedings. Two issues facing the trial court are whether the child
will testify and in what surroundings the testimony will take place.
It is less likely that the child will have to testify in a juvenile pro-
ceeding because the child's statements may be contained in the social
report, and the social report is admissible as part of the moving
party's case-in-chief. 27 If the child is called as a witness, statutory
and case law permit the child to testify outside the presence of the
parent at both the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings. 2
3. Discovery
a. Family Court
Discovery in family law cases is governed by civil discovery stat-
utes and any local rules adopted by the superior court. 29 Two
problems arise in the context of discovery which bear upon the inter-
ests of the child. First, civil discovery can be drawn out. Discovery
battles can delay the trial of the custody issues for months. Given the
statutory preference for hearing custody cases as soon as possible,
such delay is most likely not in the child's best interests.
Second, as part of the discovery process, each of the parents and
the court may wish to have the child evaluated. These evaluations
usually involve meetings between a psychologist, psychiatrist, li-
censed marriage or family counselor or other person, and the child
and possibly family members to discuss the case, including any abuse
allegations. The evaluator then renders a report to the court. In fam-
ily court, absent some court order, there is nothing to prevent each
parent from securing one or more evaluations of the child.' 30
b. Juvenile Court.
Civil discovery rules do not apply in juvenile court. Juvenile
court discovery is governed by California Rule of Court 1341.'
127. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., In re Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d 414, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986); In re
Tanya P., 120 Cal. App. 3d 66, 174 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1981); In re Stanley F., 86 Cal. App. 3d
568, 152 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1978). See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350 (West Supp. 1987).
129. There are no special discovery statutes under the Family Law Act.
130. Unless there is an order prohibiting it, a parent may take a child to a doctor,
psychologist or mental health professional whenever the child is with the parent. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4600.5(c), (1) (West Supp. 1987).
131. CAL. R. CT. 1341 (West 1987).
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This rule emphasizes informal discovery and discourages formal civil
discovery.' 8 2 In dependency and criminal proceedings, it is significant
that multiple evaluations of a child victim are not possible without
court approval." 8
4. Testimony of the Parent
Parents often testify in each of the two court settings and may
be called by any party in either court. 3 Parents in family court find
they have more evidentiary and procedural protection than in juve-
nile court. Juvenile court procedures are designed to gain the truth
about child abuse allegations even if traditional evidentiary protec-
tions are overridden.
13 5
a. Family Court
A parent may avail himself of several privileges as a witness.
These include the privilege against self-incrimination,' 36 the privi-
lege against testifying against one's spouse, 3 " and the privilege
against revealing marital communications.' 8
b. Juvenile Court
In dependency proceedings, a parent can be called to the wit-
ness stand, granted immunity and ordered to testify about the facts
132. The formal tools of discovery such as depositions and interrogatories are infre-
quently utilized, first because of time constraints and second, because local rules may not per-
mit them without court approval. Juvenile law discovery is more under the control of the court
than is civil discovery in family court.
133. In re Dolly A., 177 Cal. App. 3d 195, 222 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1986); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1112 (West 1985). Whether the non-abusing parent could take the child to multiple
evaluations without court approval has not been addressed by the appellate courts. In practice,
this frequently occurs. See also People v. Nokes, 183 Cal. App. 3d 468, 228 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1986). This does not mean that the child may have been subjected to multiple interviews or
evaluations before legal proceedings commenced. It is likely that the child is exposed to the
multiple interviews and evaluations regardless of the type of legal proceeding ultimately
commenced.
134. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
135. Dependency proceedings may require that a trial court consider the results of a
polygraph test when that test might be a measure of a parent's honesty regarding protections
afforded the child. See In re Kathleen W., No. F006971 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1987).
Moreover, parents in a dependency proceeding may not conceal the contents of a medical
report prepared by a court appointed medical expert. Such a report and the opinions contained
therein are available to all parties. See Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 47, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 273 (1977).
136. CAL. EViD. CODE § 940 (West 1966); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
137. CAL. EvID. CODE § 970 (West 1966).
138. Id. at § 980.
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surrounding the alleged abuse. 139 Section 355.7 provides that any
such testimony cannot be used in other legal proceedings. 40 In In re
Amos L.,"' the court held that the trial court need not admonish a
parent of her privilege against self-incrimination since the testimony
is prohibited from being admitted as evidence in any other action or
proceeding." 2
In a dependency proceeding, spousal and marital communica-
tions privileges" 4 are not available to a parent or guardian."' Thus,
the parent may not resort to the privilege to avoid testifying, being
called as a witness against a spouse, or to refuse to disclose confiden-
tial marital communications.
5. Presumptions
In juvenile court, several evidentiary presumptions have been
developed to make it more likely that evidence of abuse will be re-
ceived by the court and that the court will intervene on behalf of the
minor. The Welfare and Institutions Code provides that, if certain
facts are provided, there is a presumption of abuse or neglect unless
the parent produces evidence to rebut the presumption." For exam-
ple, section 355.1 provides:
Where the court finds, based upon competent professional
evidence, that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sus-
tained by a minor, of such nature as would ordinarily not be
sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful
acts or omissions of either parent, the guardian, or other person
who has the care or custody of the minor, such evidence shall be
prima facie evidence of the minor's need of proper and effective
parental care, and such proof shall be sufficient to support afinding that the minor is described by subdivision (a) of Section
300. 146
The code provides for other presumptions, including presumptions
that the child's home is unfit by reason of neglect," 7 cruelty" 8 and
139. CAl.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.7 (West 1984).
140. Id.
141. 124 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 177 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981).
142. 124 Cal. App. 3d at 1040, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 787. But see In re Dolly A., 177 Cal.App. 3d 195, 222 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1981), which casts some doubt on this procedure.
143. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 972(d), 986 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. R. CT. 1365(a) (West
1987).
144. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.5 (West 1984).
145. Id. at §§ 355.1-355.6.
146. Id. at § 355.1.
147. Id. at § 355.2.
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physical abuse."' 9
Once the petitioner produces sufficient evidence of "injury, inju-
ries, or detrimental condition sustained by the minor"' 50 that would
ordinarily be the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts of ei-
ther parent or caretaker, the presumption is raised that the minor is
a person described by the statute.' This presumption is unique to
dependency proceedings and can result in the juvenile court reaching
legal conclusions and taking action that is unavailable to a family
court. ' 2
E. Agencies Supporting the Court
The character of the proceedings in the two courts is reflected in
the involvement of agencies and services in each court process.
1. Family Court
In family court the only services which are available to the par-
ties are counseling, mediation and evaluations of child custody
disputes. 5 In the larger counties, these services are provided by a
branch of the probation department or by a family court service
agency.' 4 In the smaller counties, some of these services may be con-
tracted out to the private sector.
Counseling and mediation services are not intended to intrude
into the family. Counseling or conciliation is intended to provide the
parties an opportunity to talk with one another about the impending
dissolution.' In the past few years, most courts report that these
services are rarely used.' 5  Mediation services are designed to help
parents focus upon the needs of their children. The Legislature rec-
ognized that parents may have a difficult time attending to their
148. Id. at § 355.3.
149. Id. at § 355.4.
150. Id. at § 355.2.
151. Id.
152. For example, if the evidence showed that a child had been sexually abused but
there was insufficient proof to show which parent or other person was responsible, the juvenile
court would nevertheless be required to assert jurisdiction over the minor. See In re Christina
T., 184 Cal. App. 3d 630, 229 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986); In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d
593, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979).
153. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4602, 4607 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. CIv. PRoC. CODE §§
1730-70 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
154. For example, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego and Santa Clara counties fall
in this category.
155. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 1730, 1744 (West 1982).
156. This conclusion is based upon the author's discussion with most of the directors of
family court services agencies in California.
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child's needs.'" Accordingly, the Legislature made mediation
mandatory.158 Before any custody issue can be tried, the parties must
first attempt to settle the dispute through mediation. 15  Parents who
reach an agreement on their own are not required to participate in
mediation."O
Mediators attempt to help parents focus upon the child's needs
and assist them in deciding how they will share child rearing respon-
sibilities. Mediators also explain to parents what legal proceedings
they face and the legal rules the court will follow if the dispute goes
to trial. Mediators inject certain values into the custody decision
making process. They must explain to parents that the law favors
the sharing of rights and responsibilities of child rearing."' A medi-
ator who detects that the child needs a voice in the legal proceedings
can ask the judge to appoint an attorney to represent the child.'62
If mediation fails, a family court may order a child custody
investigation which can provide the court with a report and recom-
mendation relating to the custody issue."" The investigation may in-
clude the parents' allegations of deficient parenting against each
other. It also includes a statement from the child and concludes with
a recommendation from the investigator.' 4 Since the passage of the
Family Law Act in 1970,6' the concept of a spouse's fault has been
largely removed from the dissolution process.' 66 Accordingly, in this
age of "no fault" dissolutions, parties focus upon the evaluation pro-
cess. During the investigation, the evaluator may learn a great deal
about the parents and their parenting capacities that otherwise
would never have come to the attention of the court.
The evaluator attempts to determine the truth of any child
abuse allegation made by one parent against the other.' 67 The inves-
157. Civil Code section 4607(a) reads in part: "The purpose of such mediation proceed-ing shall be to reduce acrimony which may exist between the parties and to develop an agree-
ment assuring the child or children's close and continuing contact with both parents after the
marriage is dissolved." CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607(a) (West 1983).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at § 4600.1(b) (West Supp. 1987). Such agreements are not within the provi-
sions of Civil Code section 4607.
161. Id. at § 4607(a).
162. Id. at § 4607(f.
163. Id. at § 4602.
164. Id.
165. Id. at §§ 4000-5174.
166. A marital dissolution may be granted if the court finds irreconcilable differences
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. Id. at §§ 4506-08. Such afinding need not carry with it the implication that either party was at fault.
167. This may occur because there was no report to a child protective services agency
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tigative powers of the evaluator may differ significantly from those of
an investigative worker for a child protective agency. Evaluators are
usually members of a family court services staff, probation officers or
private psychologists, psychiatrists or licensed marriage or family
counselors. With the exception of probation officers, these evaluators
do not have access to the criminal histories of the parents" 8 and may
not have access to other confidential records relating to the parents or
child. Moreover, evaluators do not have the power to remove the
child from either parent's home. 1 " If an expert is needed to assist
them in the evaluations of the child or parents, the parents must
share in that expense, 7 ' unless the evaluators have the resources
within their offices to pay for that expense.
1 71
The superior court can charge for both mediation and evalua-
tion services but not for counseling. Mediation services are partially
paid for with the superior court filing fee. Evaluation services are
frequently charged per case on a sliding scale according to the par-
ent's ability to pay.
2. Juvenile Court
There are numerous agencies and services involved in the child
protection process. These agencies focus upon the detection, investi-
gation, evaluation, support and supervision of families in which child
abuse or neglect is suspected. Suspected abuse or neglect may be re-
ported by police, school authorities, medical or day-care personnel -
by anyone who regularly comes into contact with children. Child
protective services, probation and welfare department officials, and
law enforcement personnel usually investigate these cases. In addi-
tion, evaluations are often provided by medical or psychological
experts utilized by the investigators. Support services and supervision
are generally provided by welfare or social service departments
which may refer families to other agencies for special services.
Most of these services are paid for by the state without parental
pursuant to the mandatory reporting law or because after a report the child services investiga-
tor chose not to intervene in the family law case. See generally supra notes 56-70 and accom-
panying text, regarding the role of the investigation worker.
168. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11105-07 (West 1982).
169. That power is reserved for members of a child protective agency. See id. at §
11165; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 305-06 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
170. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 730, 731(c) (West 1983).
171. The adequacy of the evaluator's investigatory powers and resources to investigate
child abuse allegations varies from county to county depending upon the powers of the person
performing the evaluation and the cooperation and coordination with the child agency
investigator.
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reimbursement. The court has the power to order payment for the
evaluative services of psychiatrists, psychologists, physicians and sur-
geons, dentists, optometrists, audiologists, or other clinical experts
required to determine the appropriate treatment of the minor and as
may be required in the implementation of such treatment.17' To the
extent that a child has needs which must be assessed and treated, thejuvenile court is in a far superior position to provide the resources to
meet those needs.
F. Power of the Court
The power of the family and juvenile courts to make orders
relating to the care, custody and control of a child are different in
significant ways.
1. Family Court
In family law proceedings, the court most frequently approves
of the parties' stipulation and enters a judgment."' 3 In contested
cases, the court usually allocates each parent's time with the child
and each parent's responsibilities regarding the child's upbringing.17
In some cases, after reading the investigatory report and hearing
the evidence, the court is persuaded that the child needs some form
of protection from one or both parents. The court may limit contact
between the child and one parent by ordering limited visitation, su-
pervised visitation or no visitation at all between that parent and the
child.175 In order to deny a parent access to his child, the court must
find that such contact would not be in the child's best interests and
would be detrimental to the child.17 The court can also issue no
contact orders between that parent and the custodial parent and can
prohibit that parent from contacting, annoying, molesting, harassing
or disturbing the peace of the custodial parent and the child. Ad-
ditionally, the court can order the non-custodial parent to stay away
from designated places which the custodial parent and child might
172. CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 741 (West Supp. 1987).
173. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600.1(b) (West Supp. 1987).
174. Id. at §§ 4600, 4600.5.
175. Id. at §§ 4601, 4601.5 (West 1984).
176. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d at 679, 523 P.2d at 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 444; In re
Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1980); In re Marriage of
Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West
Supp. 1987).
177. CAl.. Civ. CODE § 4359 (West Supp. 1987).
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visit.18 A family court may not, however, condition a parent's con-
tact with his child upon the parent's participation in counseling, 79
on payment of child support, or on undergoing psychotherapy.
1 80
Two cases help define the family court judge's limitations in
making custody and visitation orders. In In re Marriage of Mat-
thews,18 ' the trial court in post-dissolution of marriage proceedings
made a number of orders concerning the conditions that mother, as
custodial parent, must follow.' 82 Specifically, the court ordered that a
particular conciliation counselor 88 be empowered to supervise visita-
tion with father and modify the visitation schedule as she may deem
reasonably necessary.' 84 Secondly, the court ordered mother to "un-
dergo therapy or counseling with Dr. Zimmerman for as long as [the
doctor] deemed necessary and that she 'comply and cooperate in any
way requested by Dr. Zimmerman.' "I8 Thirdly, the court ordered
that mother transport the children to the "place of visitation.' 86
The court of appeal reversed portions of the trial court's custo-
dial orders. The appellate court held that while the conciliation
counselor could supervise visitation, she could not modify the visita-
tion schedule as she deemed reasonable and necessary because it
would be an improper delegation of judicial power to a subordinate
court attache. 8
The appellate court found that the trial court lacked power to
order mother into counseling or psychiatric therapy and that such an
order would require legislative authorization with procedural safe-
178. Id. With regard to the creation and enforcement of restraining orders, the family
court has more power than the juvenile court. A family court judge can issue restraining orders
against one or both parents, or third parties, prohibiting certain conduct when the court finds
such orders necessary for the protection of the petitioning party. Id. Law enforcement person-
nel have responded to requests for enforcement of those restraining orders.
No comparable powers exist in the juvenile court. Moreover, to the extent that the juve-
nile court fashions a similar order, it may not be honored by law enforcement personnel.
Juvenile court law should be expanded to include the powers available to the family law judge,
and those orders made by the juvenile court judge should be as enforceable as family court
orders.
179. In re Marriage of Matthews, 101 Cal. App. 3d 811, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1980).
180. Camacho v. Camacho, 173 Cal. App. 3d 214, 218 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1985).
181. '101 Cal. App. 3d 811, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1980).
182. Id. at 814-15, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
183. The court selected Elizabeth O'Neil of the Alameda County Conciliation Court.
Id. at 815, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
184. Id. at 816, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
185. Id. at 817, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 883
186. Id. at 818, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
187. Id.
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guards. 86 The delegation of authority to Dr. Zimmerman was also
held to be invalid."' Finally, the court affirmed the trial court's or-
der that mother deliver the children to the place of visitation even
though visitation was a substantial distance away. 9°
The case of Camacho v. Camacho"' involved a paternity and
visitation action initiated by father. At trial, mother's expert witness,
Dr. Kellerman, testified that father and son had no father-child at-
tachment and that father was a psychological stranger to the child."' 2
Dr. Kellerman testified that mother told him father was an irrespon-
sible person who did not follow through on his visitation promises
and concluded that it would be traumatic for the child should father
discontinue permitted visitation.'" He recommended that any visita-
tion be gradual and monitored, that the child should not be forced to
separate from his mother and that any visitation should be accompa-
nied by psychological counseling for all three individuals involved. 94
The trial court found father to be the natural father, and conditioned
visitation rights on the timely payment of child support and father's
regular counseling from one of three psychotherapists recommended
by Dr. Kellerman."' The court made a number of findings to sup-
port its orders."'
188. Id. "Such a significant curtailment of Leslie's [mother's] liberty would, at least,
require legislative authorization. Undoubtably if such legislation were enacted, it would pro-
vide for procedural safeguards which were not here accorded to her." Id.
189. Id. at 817-18, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83.
190. When the order was rendered, mother lived in Walnut Creek and father had re-
cently moved to St. Helena. Id. at 818, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
191. 173 Cal. App. 3d 214, 218 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1985).
192. Id. at 217, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
193. Id. at 217, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 217-18, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
The court stated that the imposition of those conditions on appellant's right of visitation
was required in order:
(A) To avoid detriment to said minor child, as provided for in Civil Code
Section 4601.
(B) To encourage and promote the best interests and welfare of the said
minor child.
(C) To encourage and promote consistency and continuity in the relation-
ship between Plaintiff and said minor child.
(D) To encourage and promote responsibility, both emotionally and finan-
cially, on the part of Plaintiff with regard to Plaintiff's relationship with said
minor child.
(E) To encourage and promote the stabilization of Plaintiff's relationship
with said minor child.
(F) To encourage and promote a commitment on the part of Plaintiff in
connection with and with regard to his relationship with said minor child, con-
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The appellate court reversed, holding that visitation rights and
child support are independent and that one cannot be used as a rea-
son to deny the other. 9 Citing In re Marriage of Matthews, the
court also held that the trial court could not order involuntary psy-
chiatric.therapy for an indefinite time.' 98
Matthews and Camacho highlight the limitations facing family
court judges who may strongly believe that some intervention or
supervision is necessary to protect a child, but who are unable to
provide that intervention because of an insufficient legal basis. What
are the options for the family court judge who concludes that one
parent has or both parents have serious flaws which will have a det-
rimental effect upon the child? The family courts in Matthews and
Camacho lacked the power believed necessary to serve the best inter-
ests of the children involved.' 99 Accordingly, two alternatives to the
current law seem worthwhile. One alternative is to strengthen the
power of the family courts so that the judge can make restrictive
orders on parental behavior as conditions of custody or visitation for
that parent. The second option is to request that the juvenile court
become involved.
20 0
If the family court judge finds the best interests of the child
sistent with all of the findings and Orders contained herein, so .as to have the
dual purpose of not only encouraging and promoting improvement of Plaintiff's
character with regard to his said relationship with said minor child, but to also,
as aforesaid, encourage and promote the best interests and welfare of said minor
child.
(G) Finally, Plaintiff is admonished to achieve the emotional maturity ex-
pected of a father who is sincerely interested in his son.
Id.
197. Id. at 219-20, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
198. See also In re Marriage of Jenkens, 116 Cal. App. 3d 767, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331
(1981). That case noted that "child placement decisions must take into account the law's limi-
tations, in capacity to supervise interpersonal relationships." Id. at 775, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
In the case of In re Robert D., 151 Cal. App. 3d 391, 198 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1984), the
court stated:
While counseling rather than psychiatric examination was the objective of this
particular order, the most this or any other court may do is express the thought
that psychological counseling of the mother and these grandparents might have
a most valuable and beneficial effect of reducing intrafamily tension. But such
counseling cannot be forced, no authority exists for compelling it.
Id. at 398, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
199. In re Marriage of Matthews, 101 Cal. App. 3d 811, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1980);
Camacho v. Camacho, 173 Cal. App. 3d 214, 218 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1985).
.200. Because of the superior resources available to the juvenile court, the non-custodial
parent may have a better opportunity to re-establish or maintain a relationship with the child.
Supervision of visitation, therapy for the child and for the entire family, and evaluations of the
family are all more easily procured and financed in the juvenile court. For an indigent parent,
this is particularly important.
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require placing restrictions on a non-custodial (visiting) parent, the
court should have the authority to make conditional orders after
proper notice and findings.2"1 Before making any such order, the
court should be required to find that the restriction is in the child's
best interests and that visitation would be detrimental to the child
without such condition. When the conditions or restrictions relate to
the custodial parent, the family court should refer the matter to thejuvenile court for further proceedings. If the juvenile court concludes
that there are insufficient grounds to justify juvenile court interven-
tion, the matter should not be pursued in either court.
Whether the family court can remove a child from both parents'
care and control is a puzzling issue. It appears that the family court
has, on occasion, taken such action based upon the language of Civil
Code section 4600, which reads in part:
(b) Custody should be awarded in the following order of prefer-
ence according to the best interests of the child pursuant to
Section 4608:
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 or
to either parent ...
(2) If to neither parent, to the person or persons in whose
home the child has been living in a wholesome and stable
environment.
(3) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to
be suitable and able to provide adequate and proper care and
guidance for the child.
(c) Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a per-
son or persons other than a parent, without the consent of the
parents, it shall make a finding that an award of custody to a
parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a
non-parent is required to serve the best interests of the
child .... 202
Chaffin v. Frye203 presents an example of a family court judge
awarding custody of a minor to relatives pursuant to section 4600.
The mother and father were divorced in 1962 with mother receiving
custody of the two children.204 Mother and children resided with
mother's parents, the Fryes, until 1968 when mother moved to Cali-
201. A.B. 2791 proposed the addition of Civil Code section 4610 to permit the family
court judge to order a party to participate in counseling. The bill did not pass.
202. CAL.. Civ. CoDE § 4600(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1987). For an example of a trial
court's attempt to utilize Civil Code section 4600 as the basis for removal of a child in adependency proceeding, see In re James T., No. G003648 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 1987).
203. 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1976).
204. Id. at 42, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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fornia, while the Fryes and the children remained in Washington.2 5
In 1973 mother petitioned the superior court in Los Angeles County
for custody of the children, and the Fryes cross-complained for cus-
tody arguing that placement with mother would be detrimental to
the children.2 °0 Noting mother's unstable life style, her disability, her
homosexuality and the grandparents' stability, the probation depart-
ment investigator recommended placement with the grandparents."'
The trial court awarded custody of thechildren to the grandparents
with reasonable rights of visitation to mother.2"' The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's finding that there was a sufficient factual
basis for the findings of detriment required by section 4600.209
Both the ruling in Chaffin and the suggestion that a non-parent
can use the family court as a means of depriving a parent of custody
seem incorrect for several reasons. First, the person awarded custody
of the child has no legal authority to assist the child in many critical
life issues such as school enrollment and medical care. It is necessary
to have the status of parent or legal guardian to be able to make such
decisions for the child. Second, a placement with a non-relative who
is not licensed as a foster home is not legal pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code sections 16507 and 16507.4.210 Third, this type of
placement runs counter to the dependency law and, in particular,
that portion of the law created by Senate Bill 14 in 1982.11 This
205. Id.
206. Id. at 42, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
207. Id. at 42-44, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
208. Id. at 42, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
209. Id. at 44-45, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25.
210. Parents can place children with relatives without state approval. They cannot place
a child in a non-relative home without state approval. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16507,
16507.4 (West Supp. 1987).
211. The goals and methods of California's child welfare system were restructured by
Senate Bill 14. 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5144 (West) (Public Social Services - Conformance to
Federal Legislation). The changes brought California into compliance with the Federal Adop-
tion Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
Specifically, the new law made the following changes in California:
- Imposed stricter legal standards governing removal of children from their
homes.
- Required welfare departments to attempt to maintain the natural family set-
ting through provision of services such as counseling, respite care, homemaking
classes and, where necessary, in-home caretakers.
- Limited family reunification services to 18 months and required courts to
conduct formal case reviews every six months.
- Required courts, as part of the case review, to adopt a permanent placement
plan for any child remaining in foster care for 18 months or more. First priority
under this plan must be given to adoption, followed by guardianship and then
long-term foster care.
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law reflects several underlying policies: children should be raised by
their parents; services should be provided by the state to assist the
family before any removal is made; if a child is removed, immediate
and intensive services should be provided to reunify the family; and,
if reunification services fail, the child should be placed in a perma-
nent home (either in long term foster care, with a legal guardian, orby means of adoption). 12 The family law statutes ignore these de-
pendency law policies. Fourth, any of the restrictions placed on the
parent or new placement by the family court are not supervised by
any official of the state. " " If this portion of section 4600 is to be
utilized, the family law should be rewritten first to consider whether
the language of 4 600(c) should be modified and, second, to provide
for coordination with the guardianship and dependency law.214
2. Juvenile Court
In juvenile dependency proceedings, the court may order ser-
vices while the child remains in the home or remove the child from
both parents and place him with a relative, or in a foster or private
institutional setting.21" The options available to the court are part of
a complex protection scheme which is designed to result in either the
return of the child to the parent or a long-term placement for the
child.216
The juvenile court can condition return of a dependent child to
a parent on any conditions reasonably related to the protection of the
child."' Common orders include individual counseling for any or all
family members, family counseling, services from a public health
nurse, parenting classes, remaining drug free while caring for the
child, making certain that an identified abuser has no contact with
the child, providing adequate housing and providing adequate day
- Required welfare departments to maintain written case plans for every child
subject to their care, and to have worker/child contacts at least once a month.Report by the CALIFORNIA SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILD & YOUTH, December,
1986.
212. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 219-23 regarding supervision; see also In reMarriage of Jenkens, 116 Cal. App. 3d 767, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1981).
214. For guardianship law, see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1500-1601 (West 1981 & Supp.1987). For juvenile dependency law, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300-80 (West 1984 &Supp. 1987). See also Bodenheimer, Intestate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203 (1981).
215. CAL.. WEL.F. & INST. CODE §§ 360-62 (West Supp. 1987).
216. Id. CAL. R. CT. 1377(f) (West 1987). See also supra note 32.
217. See In re W.O., 88 Cal. App. 3d 906, 152 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1979).
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care. Moreover, the court can coerce parents into following its direc-
tions by ordering that a removed child will not be returned unless
the parents follow through on a reunification plan which includes
many of the orders listed above. 18
G. Supervision and Enforcement of Orders
The power of the two courts in cases relating to children are
limited by the court's ability to make certain that its orders are being
followed by parents, children and others. For example, in many sex-
ual abuse cases, it is recommended that the child victim receive
therapy and that her contact with the abusing parent be limited or
terminated until otherwise recommended by the therapist and ap-
proved by the court.
1. Family Court
Unless the custodial parent or the child informs the court, a
family court has no way of learning whether the parent is taking the
child to therapy sessions or whether the offending parent is visiting
with the child.2 1' The family court must rely upon the non-offending
parent to protect the child and insure that she is receiving the treat-
ment recommended. The court cannot order supervision by social
agencies on the child's behalf. Even if the court learns that the abus-
ing parent is having contact with the child, there is little the court
can do. Judges are not well equipped to initiate legal proceedings.
The family court judge's best option is referral to juvenile court or a
child protective agency.
220
2. Juvenile Court
The juvenile court is in a much better position to supervise and
enforce the orders it makes. Each informal agreement or dependency
order is supervised by an assigned worker from the welfare or pro-
bation department. Not only are these workers in contact with the
218. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.5, 362 (West Supp. 1987). The juvenile court
does not, however, have available to it the powers described in Civil Code section 4359. Wel-
fare and Institutions Code sections 213 and 245.5 are not as extensive as Civil Code section
4359. Legislation should be drafted to provide the juvenile court with at least the same powers
as the family and other civil courts in this respect.
219. See supra notes 188 & 198 and accompanying text.
220. The judge could initiate the legal proceedings by an order to show cause. This,
however, is cumbersome for two reasons: judges do not operate law offices, having neither the
time nor the resources for such actions, and the judge may have to be the moving party in the
order to show cause.
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parents and child, they also provide services for both, pursuant to the
court order or informal agreement. The supervising worker verifies
that the parents are complying with their part of the order or agree-
ment. If there is a violation of the court order, the supervising
worker can quickly bring the case back to the court's attention.221 In
addition, the supervising worker can remove the child from the cus-
tody of the parents.222 Every six months the worker must provide a
report to the court describing the services offered to the family and
the progress made by the family in eliminating the conditions requir-
ing court supervision. 223
It is evident from the discussion in this section that the juvenile
court is better equipped to investigate and try child abuse allegations,
and subsequently protect and supervise an abused child. Because of
the extraordinary increase in the amount of child abuse cases re-
ported, many such cases regularly appear in family courts. Some
cases may appear in family court and juvenile court simultaneously.
The following section of this article focuses upon the relationship
between the two courts in such situations.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY AND JUVENILE
COURTS
After an allegation indicating that one parent has been abusive
towards his child or is unable to protect the child from further abuse,
numerous issues must be addressed by the legal system. The goal is
to find a protective parent with whom the child can safely live. Sec-
ondarily, the court must determine what contact, if any, the other
parent should have with the child.
221. CAl.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 387 (West Supp. 1987). See Ansley v. Superior
Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 477, 229 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1986).
222. CAl.. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 305, 307, 309 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987). The text
of section 305 reads:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a
minor:
(a) Who is under the age of 18 years when such officer has reasonable
cause for believing that such minor is described in Section 300,(b) Who is a dependent child of the juvenile court or concerning whom an
order has been made under Section 320 or 356 when such officer has reasonable
cause for believing that person has violated an order of the juvenile court or has
escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, or(c) Who is under the age of 18 years and who is found in any street or
public place suffering from any sickness or injury which requires care, medical
treatment, hospitalization, or other remedial care.
Id. at § 305 (West 1984).
223. Id. at § 364 (West Supp. 1987).
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Closely related to these issues is the question of which court,
family or juvenile, should investigate and adjudicate the allegations.
If the allegations are proven, a decision must be made as to which
court should issue protective orders and, if necessary, which court
should supervise the child after the orders have been made.
Resolution of the issues involving the juvenile and family courts
depends upon the size and structure of the court system. The larger
the court the more likely it will be divided into specialized depart-
ments performing particular assignments.2" ' This division enables
large courts to take advantage of economies of scale which include
minimal movement of critical personnel from department to depart-
ment as each successive case is heard on the calendar and the
development of expertise in certain areas of the law. Most metropoli-
tan courts have specialized subject matter departments, including ju-
venile and family departments. Smaller courts often do not special-
ize. Courts with only one or two departments have little opportunity
to specialize since they must hear all varieties of cases in the same
one or two departments.
In most states the family and juvenile court functions are per-
formed by distinct courts. 225 Thus, as the number of departments in
a particular jurisdiction grows, it is likely that the two courts will be
separated. In a few states and cities, the family and juvenile court
functions have been consolidated in one family court.2 6 Whether it
224. A court might have criminal, civil, probate, family and juvenile departments. In
large metropolitan courts there may be further specialization. The juvenile court may divide its
dependency and delinquency cases into separate departments. The family court may have one
or more departments handling only ex parte requests or short cause matters, while other de-
partments would only hear trials.
225. Only Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina
and the District of Columbia have statewide family court jurisdictions. The cities of Tusca-
loosa, Alabama, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Biloxi, Mississippi, and Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania have family court jurisdiction.
226. See supra notes 3, 224-25. Consolidated Family Court is defined in The Standards
for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, Report of the National Advisory Committee for
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, 1980, Wash. D.C. at 3.1 The Courts, and 3.11 Jurisdiction
(hereinafter Standards]:
Jurisdiction over matters relating to juveniles should be placed in a family court.
The family court should have exclusive original jurisdiction over matters relat-
ing to delinquency as specified in Standard 3.111; noncriminal misbehavior as
specified in Standard 3.112; neglect or abuse of juveniles as specified in Stan-
dard 3.113; adoptions and terminations of parental rights; appointment of a le-
gal guardian for juveniles; admission for services for the mentally ill or mentally
retarded persons and persons addicted to alcohol or narcotic drugs; the interstate
compacts on juveniles and on the placement of children; divorce; separation; an-
nulment; alimony; custody and support of children; paternity; and the uniform,
reciprocal enforcement of support act; as well as intra-family criminal offenses
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is preferable to have such a consolidated family court is a complex
issue beyond the scope of this article.117
Whether large or small, separate or consolidated, similar issues
of coordination are presented. If child abuse allegations arise during
family law proceedings, how should the decision whether to com-
mence proceedings pursuant to the juvenile law be made? Juvenile
proceedings are distinct from family law matters involving different
investigative personnel, attorneys for the child and state, and the
other differences described in part I of this article. Even if the new
participants were to appear in the same courtroom before the samejudge, it would take time to activate them.22 Either as a consolidated
or separate court, the communication and cooperation between per-
sonnel serving the two courts will determine how well child abuse
cases are managed.
The remainder of this section will focus upon California family
and juvenile courts and how they coordinate court functions after
child abuse allegations have been made.
A. Family Court
If child abuse is alleged in the context of a family proceeding,
the family court services personnel,22" a therapist230 or someone else
covered by the mandatory reporting law will probably23' report the
allegation to the local child protective agency. 232 After the initial re-
sponse to the report, an investigating officer 23 3 must decide whether
to intervene or to permit the family court to retain the case without
juvenile court interference.23 4
and contributing to the delinquency of a minor as specified in Standard 3.117.
Id.
227. See Standards, supra note 226, at Commentary; Gordon, Establishing a Family
Court System, 28 Juv. JUST., Nov. 1977, at 9. Other materials are available from Mr. Hunter
Hurst at the National Center for Juvenile Justice, 701 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylva-
nia 15219.
228. In large jurisdictions, if the case remains before the same judge, there is a loss of
economies of scale. The same judge hears both family and juvenile cases. Participants must
move from court to court depending on when juvenile cases are heard.
229. CAL.. PENAl. CODE § 11165(j) (West Supp. 1987); SANTA CLARA COUNTy SUPE-
RIOR COURT RULES 17B(1)(c).
230. CAL.. PENAL CODE § 11165(i) (West Supp. 1987).
231. See id. at § 11166(a), which describes when someone covered by the statute "shall"
report child abuse allegations.
232. Id. at § 11165(k) (West Supp. 1987). The reporting statute has been held to be
constitutional. People v. Battaglia, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 203 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1984).
233. The investigating officer may be a social worker or probation officer depending on
the county. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 305, 306, 309 (West Supp. 1987).
234. In some states, such an allegation in a family law proceeding mandates transfer of
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The investigator's first decision depends upon whether the
abuse allegation is contested. If the abuse allegation is contested and
likely to be tried, the investigating worker decides which court makes
that determination. If the abuse issue is not contested, the worker
decides which court makes the custody decision and any protective
orders necessary for the welfare of the child.
In determining the preferable court to hear the child abuse alle-
gation, the worker should examine a series of factors:
1. What kind of an abuse allegation has been made? Certain
types of abuse are more difficult to prove in court. A sexual abuse
allegation involving a young child may require more complicated evi-
dentiary, procedural and investigative issues than a physical abuse
allegation.
2. What is the strength of the child abuse allegation? Is it well
documented through timely police and medical reports? Will the
child be a good witness?
3. At what stage of the family court proceedings was the child
abuse allegation raised? Was the allegation made at the outset, dur-
ing discovery or in the middle of a contested hearing? Has the family
court made a finding regarding the allegation?
4. Will it be necessary to utilize the superior investigative tools
of the juvenile court investigator in order to protect the child?
5. What is the attitude of each parent, and, if applicable, the
alleged abuser, toward the allegations?285 Would the presumptions
contained in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 355.1 et. seq. be
helpful in determining the truth of the allegations?
6. Does the investigating worker believe that the family court
can adequately protect the child?
7. What resources are available to the non-abusing parent to
protect the child?
Based upon these considerations the investigating worker has
the case to juvenile court for determination of the facts. In re Eckman, 645 P.2d 866 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); Ex parte J.A.P., 546 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Neal v. Washington, 158
Ga. App. 39, 279 S.E.2d 294 (1981). See also ATT'Y GEN'S. COMM'N ON THE ENFORCEMENT
or CHILD ABUSE LAWS, FINAl. REPORT, April 1985. In that report, Prosecution Recommen-
dation II.B.3. provides that "[tihe Commission recommends that the Attorney General sponsor
legislation to require the courts to refer any allegation of child abuse arising in a family law
proceeding to the county welfare department for an assessment and a report back to the court."
Id. at 3-17.
235. For example, does a parent acknowledge that a particular third party (stepfather,
boyfriend, etc.) may be responsible for the abuse? Compare the facts of Jennifer P., 174 Cal.
App. 3d 322, 219 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1985) with In re Angela P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 623 P.2d 198,
171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981).
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several options. He can initiate juvenile court proceedings by filing a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition. This frequently
results in suspension of the family court custody proceedings until
the juvenile court petition is heard.2"' Alternatively, the investigator
can reach an informal supervision agreement with the parents
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 330.237 The inves-
tigating worker can also decline to intervene pending resolution of
the family court proceedings.2 8" Finally, the worker can simply close
the investigation.
These four options represent a continuum of intervention strate-
gies which enable the investigator to intervene in the family accord-
ing to the needs of the child. If the investigator is satisfied that a
parent is protecting the child from further abuse and ensuring that
the child's needs are met, formal action is less likely. If, on the other
236. But see In re William T., 172 Cal. App. 3d 790, 218 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1985); In re
Brendan P., 184 Cal. App. 3d 910, 230 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1986).
237. This type of resolution is unlikely if one of the parents denies that the abuse tookplace, but would be possible if the abuser was a non-parent and each parent acknowledged
that person's responsibility.
If the child has been abused by a non-parent, the informal supervision contract might
require that the custodial parent: (1) not permit the abuser to have any contact with the child,
nor visit the child's home; (2) secure family court restraining orders to ensure police support of
any violation of (1); and (3) have the child begin and continue in therapy until the therapist
and social worker agree it is no longer necessary. Such an intervention would result in a social
worker supervising the case for six months to ensure that the custodial parent complied with
the terms of the agreement. The social worker may also assist the parent in completing the
tasks outlined.
Another example in which informal supervision can be utilized involves situations of ex-
treme family conflict after the parents separate. This typically involves fighting when the child
is exchanged between parents, disparaging comments from each parent toward the other in thepresence of the child, and a lack of cooperation between the parents regarding the child's needs
- all resulting in the child suffering psychological trauma.
On occasion the family court will be unable to control such parents because of the inten-
sity of the hostility and intransigence. In these situations, the informal supervision agreement
can provide for more control over parental battles, perhaps including supervision of visitation
exchanges and counseling for all family members. By the nature of the agreement, a social
worker will supervise the progress of these agreements.
Based on the facts of the hypothetical involving Mary and Harry Jones at the beginning
of the article, the factors listed suggest that the case should proceed in juvenile court. Father is
contesting the allegations, and he plans to have Jane re-evaluated. The child is likely to expe-
rience multiple evaluations. Moreover, Jane should have an attorney representing her through
the proceedings. It will be important to determine the truth of the child abuse allegations, and
the juvenile court has the better procedures to make that determination.
238. In monitoring the case in family court, the investigating officer may inform theparent what is expected of him or her in order to avoid juvenile court intervention. The officer
might notify the participants in the family court proceedings of his concerns and expectations.
In Santa Clara County, investigating officers sometimes attend the family court proceedings to
ensure that communication is maximized.
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hand, the parent's protective measures are less effective, it is more
likely the juvenile court will become formally involved.
If the child abuse allegation is not contested, the investigating
worker must decide which court should address the custody questions
including any orders necessary to protect the child. In making this
decision the investigator should examine a second set of factors.
1. Is the identity of the abuser known? What was the custodial
arrangement when the abuse was first reported? Were the parents
living together? Were they separated with one parent having pri-
mary custody or was there a joint custody arrangement?
2. If one parent is the abuser, what is the relationship of the
other parent to him? If the abuser is a non-parent, what is the rela-
tionship of each parent to that person?.. 9
3. What steps has each parent taken to protect the child from
further abuse?
4. What steps has each parent taken to respond to the child's
therapeutic needs?
5. What has been the attitude of each parent toward the in-
volvement of the juvenile court investigator and any law enforcement
efforts to investigate the abuse allegation?
6. What confidence does the investigative worker have in each
parent's ability to care for and protect the child?
After investigating and weighing these factors, the worker will
choose one of the same four intervention options described above.
B. Juvenile Court
If the first referral to any court system is to the juvenile court,
the investigating worker initially decides whether the abuse allega-
tions are of sufficient gravity to warrant intervention.24 If there is
insufficient proof of abuse, or if the investigating worker chooses not
to intervene, the investigating worker will not take action. Another
court, probably the family court, will be the next forum chosen if the
parents wish to litigate the matter. 41
If the investigating worker determines there is evidence of abuse
of sufficient gravity, he must then decide which court should hear the
239. The critical issue for the investigating worker is the custodial parent's indepen-
dence from the abuser. Many mothers may be emotionally or financially dependent upon the
abuser. Even though they agree to protect their child, their resolve frequently turns to
ambivalence.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
241. A parent or other interested party can appeal this decision to the juvenile court
judge. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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case. Normally, the case remains in the juvenile court because the
allegation came to the attention of the investigating worker before
any other court was involved. It is possible, however, that a non-
abusing parent could take swift action and obtain protective orders
from the family court while the investigation is being conducted.
This sometimes occurs at the suggestion of the investigator. If this
should occur, the investigator's choices are identical to his options
when the case was referred from the family court after an abuse
allegation was made.
In the remaining portion of this article a number of cases and
statutes which exemplify the relationship between the family and ju-
venile courts will be studied. They will be discussed in relationship
to the process outlined regarding the movement of a child abuse case
between the two courts.
C. Standards for Juvenile Court Intervention
One important issue facing the participants in both courts is
which cases belong in family court and which belong in juvenile
court. Are there some cases which must be processed through one
court or the other? Is there a discernible line between the two courts
defining the jurisdiction of each?
The California appellate courts have issued several opinions
which are helpful in deciding whether a case belongs in family orjuvenile court. In the case of In re Jennifer P.,24 the adoptive par-
ents dissolved their marriage, Jennifer was living with mother, while
father had reasonable visitation rights. When mother suspected that
Jennifer had been sexually molested by father during visitation, she
informed the social services department and cooperated with the po-
lice investigation and medical examinations. 4" Mother contacted thejuvenile court and cooperated in the criminal prosecution. 44 She also
went to the family court, secured a temporary restraining order
prohibiting father's visitation and entry to her house, and requested
a modification of the family law order to prohibit father's contact
with Jennifer on a permanent basis.'4" Mother then objected to fur-
ther juvenile court intervention. 46
Testimony at the juvenile court jurisdictional hearing revealed
242. 174 Cal. App. 3d 322, 219 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1985).
243. Id. at 324, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 324-25, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11.
246. Id. at 324, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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that the child psychiatrist believed mother handled the entire matter
superbly, and the social services department worker described
mother as having "demonstrated superior care and cooperation
throughout [the investigation]." 47 However, neither the family law
modification proceeding nor the criminal proceeding had concluded
and father had not expressed a willingness to stay away from
Jennifer or mother's house.
On these facts the trial court sustained a dependency determina-
tion, only to have the court of appeal reverse that finding. The
appellate court suggested that the juvenile court should have confi-
dence in findings made by other superior courts, stating that "[w]e
can hardly presume the domestic court would require or allow fa-
ther-daughter contact where it would be detrimental to Jennifer's
welfare." The appellate court concluded by adding that "our sys-
tem, for better or for worse presumes that parents are the best judges
of their children's best interests.
' 249
Jennifer P. stands for the proposition that a custodial parent
who becomes aware of an abuse to her child can take sufficient pro-
tective steps so that juvenile court intervention will not be necessary
or permitted. In Jennifer P. the juvenile court investigative worker
decided incorrectly to have the juvenile court intervene for Jennifer's
protection. Based upon the guidelines listed above, intervention was
not necessary.2 50 The investigative worker had a strong suspicion as
to the identity of the abuser, and father apparently was not con-
testing the change of custody or restraining orders in family court.
Mother retained custody of Jennifer throughout the proceedings,
sought help from the family court, secured restraining orders and
terminated father's visitation. Mother also initiated counseling for
Jennifer. Finally, the investigating worker had nothing but praise
for the way in which mother handled the entire situation.
While there had been an abuse, the non-abusing custodial par-
ent took sufficient protective steps to ensure that the abuse was
stopped and that Jennifer would receive appropriate therapy. The
juvenile court could do no more and intervention was therefore un-
necessary. The investigating worker should have declined to initiate
juvenile proceedings. However, the worker might have monitored the
family court and criminal court proceedings to learn their outcome
and ensure that mother secured appropriate permanent protective
247. Id.
248. Id. at 327, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
249. Id.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 235-39.
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In re Nicole B.251 presents a similar factual context, yet a dif-
ferent result. In Nicole B. the parties stipulated to the facts which
were submitted in support of a dependency petition.252 Those facts
included: (1) a boyfriend of mother struck Nicole while spending
time with her in a park; (2) the striking was of the type contem-
plated by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(d); (3) the
boyfriend was subsequently taken to a psychiatric hospital; (4)
mother had no knowledge of the incident and was away when it
occurred; (5) the boyfriend had been residing in the house for 3
months and had known mother for 6 months; and (6) at the time of
the hearing, the boyfriend no longer resided with mother and was
not allowed to come in or about mother's residence.
On these facts the trial court sustained the petition and declared
Nicole to be a dependent child of the court, and the court of appeal
affirmed that finding.25 The appellate court stressed the fact that the
boyfriend did not express an intent to remain away from Nicole or
her mother's house. 54 Given the close relationship between mother
and the boyfriend, the court concluded there was a basis for inferring
a potential for the boyfriend's return.2 55 The court based its opinion
on its overriding concern for the protection of the minor and not on
parental unfitness.25
The court noted that the unfitness of the parent is not the deter-
minative issue under Welfare and Institutions Code section
300(d).2 57 Rather, the court must look to past events for aid in the
determination of the present fitness of a child's home for the purpose
of deciding whether the juvenile court should assume jurisdiction
over the child.256
Nicole B. held that a non-abusing custodial parent whose child
is abused cannot prevent juvenile court intervention when she has
not taken sufficient steps to protect the child from further abuse.259 It
was mother's live-in relationship with the abuser that was of contin-
uing concern to the investigating worker and subsequently to the
251. 93 Cal. App. 3d 874, 155 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1979). Nicole B. relied heavily upon In
re Melissa H., 38 Cal. App. 3d 173, 113 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1977).
252. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
253. Id. at 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
254. Id. at 878-79, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
255. Id. at 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 878, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 881-82, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
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trial judge. Furthermore, although not specifically noted in the ap-
pellate court opinion, mother had taken no protective steps such as
securing family court restraining orders. Finally, the opinion
suggested that neither the investigating worker nor the judge had
confidence in the mother's ability to protect the child from future
contacts with the boyfriend. 60 The child required supervision for a
period of time.26'
A comparison of the rules enunciated in Nicole B. and Jennifer
P. is instructive. If a parent, upon discovery of an abuse, takes ade-
quate steps to protect the child from further abuse, and responds to
the needs of the child, the juvenile court has no basis to sustain a
dependency petition as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, the
non-offending parent takes insufficient steps to protect the child or
fails to respond to the needs of the child, dependency may be in-
voked. For example, if Nicole's mother had obtained a restraining
order prohibiting the boyfriend from contacting Nicole or from com-
ing to the house, and had indicated that her relationship with him
was over, the result might have been different.
The inquiry in each case centers around mother's ability to
protect the child and provide for the child's needs without state inter-
vention and supervision. Dozens of similar decisions are made daily
in cases throughout the state.2" Usually, an investigating worker de-
cides whether to intervene based upon considerations similar to those
discussed in Nicole B. and Jennifer P. The worker also evaluates
mother's attitude regarding the abuse allegations. In many of these
cases, mother must make the difficult choice between protecting her
child and deciding to maintain a relationship with a male who pro-
vides support for the family."' A worker who detects ambivalence
may remove the child from the mother's custody to insure the child's
protection and to prevent mother from attempting to persuade the
260. Id. at 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918. In Melissa H., the stepfather sexually assaulted
the child, and a 600(d) petition was sustained at the juvenile court jurisdictional hearing. 38
Cal. App. 3d at 174, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 140. On appeal the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding. Id. at 175, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 141. The court based its decision not on any
action of the mother, but on the overriding concern for the protection of the minor. Id. The
court noted that the stepfather's conduct as well as his stated intention to return to the family
home after he completed time in a hospital was a sufficient basis for intervention. Id.
261. Accord In re Vonda M., 2 Civ. No. B019273 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1987).
Whether Nicole, in Nicole B., could have been appropriately supervised by an informal super-
vision agreement is open to speculation. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 1.
263. See, e.g., In re Angela P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 623 P.2d 198, 17 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981);
In re Melissa H., 38 Cal. App. 3d at 173, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 139; THOMPSON, CALIFORNIA
JUVENIL COURT DFSKBOOK § 9.29 (CEB) (1984).
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child to change her story.
Nicole B. and Jennifer P. reflect situations in which juvenile
court can and cannot assume jurisdiction. The case of In re
Christina T.264 provides an example of a situation in which the juve-
nile court must assert its jurisdiction.
In Christina T., dependency proceedings were brought on
behalf of the minor, a 5 year old, alleging the minor's father had
subjected her to sexual abuse during the past six months (section
300(a)) and that her home was unfit due to the depravity of her
father (section 300(d)).26 The parents, pursuant to a marital disso-
lution agreement, shared custody of the minor; mother had nine days
a month and father the remainder. " 6 During time with mother,
Christina complained to mother and the baby sitter that father made
her take showers with him, rubbed between her legs until it hurt,
touched her buttock and slept with her in the same bed.267 Christina
later made a similar statement to an investigating detective.2 8 A doc-
tor testified that the minor's hymen was not intact, and that both her
anus and vagina were dilated, all of which was consistent with sex-
ual molestation. 26" The evidence also included testimony from a
psychiatric social worker who interviewed the minor utilizing ana-
tomically correct dolls.27 The minor took the female doll and put its
face between the male doll's legs saying, "[t]hat's what little girls
do." '' The minor also told the social worker, "[t]hat's what daddy
Peter [mother's cohabitating boyfriend] has me do."'27 2 Later, the mi-
nor retracted this statement and said it was Chris, her father, who
had done it.2 73 Father denied any molestation.2 74
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found both petitions
untrue, stating "[tihere is no question that she has been sexually mo-
lested by somebody. . . .[But since] the allegations in this petition
[have not] been proved by a preponderance of evidence, I find them
both untrue. '2 7 5
264. 184 Cal. App. 3d 630, 229 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 631-32, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
267. Id. at 633, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 634, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
270. Id. at 634, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 635, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
275. Id. at 636-37, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52.
19871
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that once the trial court
found that the minor had been molested, the statutory presumptions
were activated, and the burden of producing evidence shifted to the
parents.2" Since neither parent was able to establish the abuse oc-
curred in the home of the other parent, the petition must be
sustained as a matter of law. 2" The remaining question of who sex-
ually abused the minor was relevant to the dispositional phase of the
case and to any orders the court might fashion to assist the child.
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for further
dispositional proceedings.
2178
Christina T. stands for the proposition that when a child has
been sexually molested and the parents cannot satisfy a court as to
the identity of the perpetrator, the juvenile court must intervene on
behalf of the child.27 9 Where similar facts are discovered during a
family court proceeding or in a juvenile court trial, the participants
must recognize that the case belongs in juvenile court and appropri-
ate action should be taken to ensure that result.
Christina T. presents facts familiar to many family and juvenile
court participants: the so-called unprovable child molestation. All
participants agree that something has happened to the child, but no
one can prove who was responsible for the abuse. Had the appellate
court upheld the trial court's dismissal, further proceedings would
have taken place in the family court. That forum would have decided
issues of custodial time sharing, access to the child, and other rele-
vant issues. But the appellate court held that these facts, as a matter
of law, must result in the assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction.28°
If the juvenile court had found there was no molestation but
that the child or someone else fabricated evidence of molestation or
that the evidence of molestation was inconclusive, juvenile court ju-
risdiction would probably not have been necessary. The petitions
would have been dismissed and further proceedings would have
276. Those presumptions are contained in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 355.1,
355.2 and 355.4; Christina T., 184 Cal. App. 3d at 638 n.3, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 252 n.3.
277. 184 Cal. App. 3d at 641, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
278. Id. at 640, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
279. This result is noteworthy since both the petitions in Christina T. alleged that fa-
ther was the abuser. Id. at 631-32, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 248. The court found that he was not
proven to be the abuser. Id. at 639-40, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 253. The significance of the appellate
court ruling is that even though the petitions were not true as to the perpetrator, they were
true as to the child having been molested. The appellate court is indicating that trial judges in
similar cases should find that the petition is true with regard to the fact of sexual molestation
but not proven as to the perpetrator, and that a sufficient portion of the petition is true for the
court to sustain a finding of dependency.
280. Id. at 639-40, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 253-54.
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taken place in the family court.
If, however, the court was unsure whether a molestation had
occurred, but found that the child was traumatized by something or
someone and was behaving as though she had been sexually abused
when there was no satisfactory explanation for her behavior, a more
difficult problem would be presented. This type of case typically in-
cludes some sexualized statements by the child, inconclusive medical
evidence, resistance to visitation (usually with father), and signs of
extreme stress after visitation (bed wetting, nightmares, and acting
out behavior). This'type of case also typically involves a bitter cus-
tody battle which has followed a bitter marital dissolution. Mother
often claims that father is abusing the child, while father claims
nothing is wrong during visitation and that mother is programming
the child to produce words and responses.
This last factual situation presents difficulties for the court pro-
cess. The facts fall short of those necessary to invoke juvenile court
jurisdiction while presenting complications that make it difficult, if
not impossible, for the family court to meet the child's needs.
Whether the juvenile court should invoke its jurisdiction should be
measured by the needs of the child. In cases in which the child ex-
hibits extreme stress and competent professional testimony declares
that service or supervision is necessary, the juvenile court should as-
sert jurisdiction.28' In other cases the juvenile court should decline to
intervene.2 82
When read together, Nicole B., Jennifer P. and Christina T.
help define the jurisdictional line between the family and juvenile
courts. Under the facts in Jennifer P. the juvenile court did not have
jurisdiction; the facts in Nicole B. were sufficient for the juvenile
court to exercise its jurisdiction; and in Christina T. the facts de-
manded that the juvenile court exercise jurisdiction. This spectrum
of factual settings and appellate rulings will be of assistance in the
effort to decide how the two courts should best relate to each
other.2"'
281. See, e.g., In re Brendan P., 184 Cal. App. 3d 910, 230 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1986). See
also infra text accompanying notes 387-417.
282. These cases would remain in the family court for any further custody litigation.
283. Other cases which may be of assistance in determining the difference between the
two courts include In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 254, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967); In re Phillip
B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979); and In re Jamie M., 134 Cal. App. 3d
530, 184 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1982).
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D. Custodial Parent Abuse
A different series of problems arises when the parents are sepa-
rated, either after a dissolution or without ever having been married,
and the custodial parent is accused of abusing the minor. What are
the rights of the non-custodial parent during the dependency pro-
ceedings? What impact does any family court order have upon the
dependency proceedings?
The California appellate courts have ruled on these issues in
several cases. In In re Adele L.,2 8" the parents were married and
divorced prior to any dependency proceedings. In the divorce decree,
custody of Adele was awarded to mother.2 8 ' On October 27, 1966,
mother was taken to jail for hysteria, intoxication and a dirty
home.2 86 Adele was taken to a shelter home and dependency pro-
ceedings were initiated in juvenile court with the filing of a petition
on October 31, 1966.287 At the detention hearing on November 1st,
the court placed Adele with her father.288 On November 23rd, Adele
was placed back at the shelter because her father had allegedly made
derogatory comments about the mother in contravention of the court
order.289 A second petition based on this behavior was filed on No-
vember 28th.29 On December 1st, juvenile court jurisdiction was
sustained on the first petition, and the second petition was dis-
missed.2 91 The court found Adele to be a dependent child of the
court and ordered her placement outside of both parents' homes. '92
Father appealed and the appellate court noted that since there
was an existing family court order placing Adele with mother, she
was the only person chargeable with the responsibility for care and
control of Adele.29 The petition alleged that "the minor has no par-
ent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care
or control, or has no parent or guardian actually exercising such care
or control. ' '294 Thus, father did not qualify as such a parent because
of the previous family court order awarding mother care, custody
and control of Adele. The jurisdictional finding of the trial court was
284. 267 Cal. App. 2d 397, 73 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1968).
285. Id. at 400, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 400, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
289. Id. at 400, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 401, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 402, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
294. Id. at 399-400 n.1, 404, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 78 n.1, 81.
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affirmed.2 95
The court also found a sufficient factual basis for removing
Adele from her mother, noting mother's intoxicated condition, her
drinking habits, the turmoil caused by her temper, and the unkempt
condition of her residence. 2" However, the court found no basis on
which an order could issue denying father custody of Adele at the
dispositional hearing. The court held that, before custody could be
denied to father at the dispositional hearing, placement with father
must be found to be detrimental to the minor's best interests.2 97
Based upon Adele L., a non-custodial parent whose custodial
rights have been determined by a family court cannot prevent the
juvenile court from asserting jurisdiction. The non-custodial parent
may, however, participate fully at the dispositional hearing and must
be treated preferentially with respect to any non-parent.29 8
In In re Kelvin M.,299 father and mother were never married.
On October 12, 1976, mother threatened to kill Kelvin and was
placed in a psychiatric ward for two days.800 A 600(a) petition was
filed.301 On December 10th, that petition was sustained and custody
of Kelvin was awarded to a social services agency which then placed
Kelvin with his father.8"2 At the jurisdictional hearing father sought
custody of Kelvin and asked for an opportunity to present evidence
regarding his present fitness to care for Kelvin.30 Father claimed
that dependency proceedings were unnecessary because he was a fit
person and the court should place Kelvin with him and dismiss the
proceedings.30 4 The trial court denied this request calling his offer
irrelevant.3 ' Father appealed both the jurisdictional and disposi-
tional orders."'
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the father was
entitled to be heard at the jurisdictional hearing. 07 The court distin-
295. Id.
296. Id. at 403, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
297. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 728 (West 1984).
298. This result is different than a situation in which the custodial parent has immedi-
ate rights to custody and control of the child. The fact that there is a family court order is of
no significance. See In re Donaldson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 477, 223 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1986).
299. 77 Cal. App. 3d 396, 143 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1978).
300. Id. at 398, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
301. Id. Welfare and Institutions Code section 600(a) was a precursor to section 300(a).
302. 77 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
303. Id. at 399, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 402, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
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guished Adele L., which involved a prior family court order award-
ing custody to Adele's mother and denying visitation to Adele's fa-
ther.308 The appellate court viewed Kelvin's parents equally because
there was no prior family court order.809 Thus, father had a right to
appear at the jurisdictional hearing to prove his fitness to care for
Kelvin.
Kelvin M. raises several interesting issues. Had the father es-
tablished his paternity of Kelvin?"'0 Assuming he had, if on remand
the trial court found father to be a proper placement for Kelvin,
what action would the court take? The court could dismiss the peti-
tion and permit father to take physical custody of Kelvin. If it did,
what proof would father have to produce to show that he had legal
custody? Since there was no existing custody order, if mother asked
the police for assistance in regaining custody of Kelvin, the father
may not be able to show that he had a superior right to custody.
These concerns suggest that juvenile court should be prepared to cre-
ate an order which father could use to prove his legal custody."'
One solution to this problem is to sustain a dependency petition
based upon mother's conduct and possible future conduct towards
the child. Thereafter, the court could make a custody award to fa-
ther. If the court was satisfied that father could protect the child
from any dangers that mother might pose, it could create a family
law type order specifying the custody and visitation rights of each
parent. The court could then dismiss the case. 1 '
What if Kelvin's or Adele's parents had a joint custody award
from a family court? What should the response of the juvenile court
be? This author suggests that the previous procedures be followed. If
a child is at risk because of one parent's conduct and the other par-
ent has not taken sufficient protective measures to insure the child's
308. Id. at 403, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66.
309. Id. at 403, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
310. Implicit in father's demand is the court's recognition that he is the legal father of
Kelvin. The paternity issue arises regularly in juvenile court proceedings since many children
are born out of wedlock. In order to participate in the proceedings, the court must find that a
person is the legal father of the child in question. Even if that father is unable to care for the
child, the paternity finding will enable his relations to be considered as placement possibilities
for the child.
The appellate courts have approved of the juvenile court making paternity findings where
necessary to complete the work of the court. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119
Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975). Since this is such an important and recurring issue, the Legislature
should establish guidelines for those determinations in the juvenile court.
311. Such an order is also necessary if mother is to have an opportunity to modify the
custody status at some subsequent time.
312. See infra text accompanying notes 336-52.
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safety, the child should be a dependent of the juvenile court.3 s1 Con-
versely, if the non-offending parent took steps similar to those taken
by Jennifer P.'s mother, the juvenile court should dismiss the
petition.
This appears to be the approach adopted by the Legislature in
Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2.14 This statute provides
that a dependent child shall be placed with the non-custodial, non-
abusive parent if that parent desires custody and such placement
would not be detrimental to the best interests of the minor. This
determination is made only after the court orders removal of the mi-
nor from the custody of the custodial parent. 1 ' Section 361.2 leaves
open the question of whether the non-abusive parent can challengejuvenile court intervention at the jurisdictional hearing, 1 but sug-
gests that the preferable course of action is to sustain jurisdiction,
create a family law order and dismiss the case. 17 If the court decides
to sustain jurisdiction and place the child with the non-custodial,
313. See supra notes 251-61 and accompanying text discussing In re Nicole B.
314. The relevant portions of the statute are as follows:§ 361.2. PLACEMENT OF MINOR FOLLOWING COURT-ORDERED REMOVAL.
(a) When a court orders removal of a minor pursuant to Section 361, the
court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the minor, with whom
the minor was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose which
brought the minor within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume
custody of the minor. If such a parent requests custody the court shall place the
minor with the parent unless it finds that parent would be detrimental to the
minor.
If the court places the minor with such a parent it may do either of the
following:
(1) Order that such parent becomes legal and physical custodian of the
child. The court may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial par-
ent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the minor. The custody
order shall continue unless modified by a subsequent order of the superior court.
The order of the juvenile court shall be filed in any domestic relation proceeding
between the parents.
(2) Order that the parent assume custody subject to the supervision of the
juvenile court. In such a case the court may order that reunification services be
provided to the parent or guardian from whom the minor is being removed, or
the court may order that services be provided solely to the parent who is assum-
ing physical custody in order to allow that parent to retain later custody without
court supervision, or that services be provided to both parents, in which case the
court shall determine, at review hearings held pursuant to Section 366, which
parent, if either, shall have custody of the minor.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2 (West Supp. 1987).
315. Id. at § 361.2(a).
316. See Kelvin M., 77 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 561; see also notes 251-
61 and accompanying text.
317. This "suggestion" is contained in the language of section 361.2(a). The implication
is that the non-custodial parent will not be heard until the dispositional hearing.
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non-abusing parent, it can thereafter provide services to that parent,
reunification services to the other parent or services to both. 18
There are some situations in which the non-custodial parent is
unfit, as a matter of law, to take custody of a child who has been
abused by the custodial parent, without at least a finding of depen-
dency. In re La Shonda B.819 presents an example of this situation.
On February 10, 1978, the Los Angeles Department of Social
Services (DPSS) filed 300(a) and 300(d) petitions on behalf of La
Shonda in juvenile court.82 0 La Shonda was a two month old girl
who allegedly suffered multiple skull fractures when her mother
kicked and stomped on her."2 On February 15th, a detention hear-
ing was held and La Shonda was detained. 22 On March 1st, she
was released to her maternal grandmother's care while mother re-
mained in a mental hospital.82 La Shonda's father and mother were
not married and agreed to La Shonda's placement with her maternal
grandmother in Texas. 24 By June, father indicated he wanted
mother ultimately to have custody of the child.8 2 5 In the meantime,
father preferred to keep La Shonda himself, in spite of the fact that
he had an unstable life style, traveled frequently and had no perma-
nent residence.8 2' The juvenile court judge suggested that father get
a custody order from family court, but father did not do so.3 2 ,
At the jurisdictional hearing in November, DPSS recommended
that La Shonda be placed with her grandmother. 2 8 Father requested
custody for himself.829 The court, relying upon Kelvin M., felt com-
pelled to dismiss the petition since it found that father was a fit
parent.088
The court of appeal reversed, finding the dismissal to be an
abuse of discretion.8"' The appellate court ruled that the case was
much closer to Adele L. than to Kelvin M. pointing to the Legisla-
ture's additions of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 355.1,
318. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
319. 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 596, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 596-97, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
325. Id. at 597, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 598, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
330. Id. at 598, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
331. Id. at 599, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
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355.2, 355.3 and 355.4, which create presumptions relating to the
need for proper and effective parental care and control, neglect, cru-
elty and physical abuse."32 The court held that proof to establish
dependency with regard to either parent is simplified by these
statutes:
As a result, where there are two parents with separate homes,
the child can be removed from the home of the unfit parent at
the adjudication hearing without prejudicing the other parent's
right to gain custody of the child at the disposition hearing upon
a sufficient showing that he or she is capable of providing pa-
rental care.aaa
Under the facts of the case, the court found as a matter of law,
that father's living conditions provided inadequate stability and pro-
tection for the child and provided an insufficient basis for dismissal
of the petition. "[The court's] failure to exercise this power, in light
of our enormous concern in California that the home of a battered
child needs to be proved safe, left the baby with no protection at
all.""3
La Shonda B. appears to be consistent with both Nicole B. and
Jennifer P. To the extent that the juvenile court looks to the non-
offending parent for protection of the child, La Shonda's father fell
far short of the efforts made by Jennifer's mother. Father did not
have a stable residence, did not secure a family court order which
might provide legal protection for La Shonda against contact with
her mother, and did not state his intentions regarding his relation-
ship with the mother. Juvenile court jurisdiction was necessary to
assure La Shonda's protection.
At the dispositional hearing, La Shonda's father would have the
opportunity to prove that he could adequately provide for and pro-
tect his daughter. The court could place La Shonda with her father
as a dependent child of the court and dismiss the case once satisfied
that she was adequately protected. The court could also decide that
La Shonda should be placed either with her maternal grandmother
pursuant to the DPSS recommendation, or in another out-of-home
placement. However, the court could only issue such an order after
making the requisite findings pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 726 and Civil Code section 4600.
Like Christina T., La Shonda B. presents a factual situation
332. Id. at 599-600, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 283-84.
333. Id. at 600, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
334. Id. at 601-02, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
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which requires juvenile court intervention. The abuser in La
Shonda B. was known to the court, and the non-custodial parent
was unable, as a matter of law, to demonstrate adequate protection
for the child. The message from La Shonda B. to investigating
workers and juvenile courts is that there must be intervention in sim-
ilar situations.
In summary, Adele L., Kelvin M. and La Shonda B. stand for
the proposition that when parents are separated, a non-abusing cus-
todial parent has the right to participate at the jurisdictional hearing
on the dependency petition only if another court has not previously
made an award depriving him of physical custody. If there has been
no prior custodial order, the non-custodial parent can show the court
at the jurisdictional hearing that she has taken sufficient steps to pro-
tect the minor, thus making juvenile court intervention unnecessary.
However, if the court finds that the non-custodial parent has
not taken sufficient protective steps, it will sustain the petition and
turn to the dispositional phase of the case. At the dispositional hear-
ing, the non-custodial parent has a right to be heard and to be
treated preferentially over any non-parent. If the court is satisfied
that the non-custodial parent offers proper placement, it can place
the child with that parent either as a dependent child or on a perma-
nent basis, by creating a family law order and dismissing the juvenile
case.
33
In other words, a non-custodial parent has two opportunities to
show that he should be granted custody of a child and that the juve-
nile court need not assert jurisdiction. First, at the jurisdictional
hearing the parent may show that he is a fit and protective parent
and that no assertion of jurisdiction is necessary. Secondly, at the
dispositional hearing he may attempt to gain custody, preferably
with the creation of a family court order and a dismissal of juvenile
court jurisdiction. If this is not successful, he can argue for custody
under juvenile court supervision.
E. Creating a Family Law Order in Juvenile Court
Family court custody orders remain in effect until they are
modified, the child or parent dies, or the child becomes emancipated.
Juvenile court jurisdiction over a child is intended to be tempo-
rary.8" 6 The goal of the dependency system is to return a child to his
335. See infra text accompanying notes 336-52.
336. In re William T., 172 Cal. App. 3d 790, 218 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1985). "A reason for
recognizing concurrent jurisdiction is that hopefully jurisdiction of the juvenile court is tempo-
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parents or to find a permanent home for him or her within a speci-
fied time. Juvenile cases are dismissed when the court concludes that
its intervention is no longer necessary. The dismissal terminates state
intervention into that family's life and permits the social service
agency to close its case and focus upon more important cases.
When a juvenile case is dismissed, the custodial rights of the
parents are determined by the nature of the underlying family court
order. In some cases there is no family court order; in other cases the
underlying order is inconsistent with the findings of the juvenile
court as to the preferable scheme to protect the minor."' 7 In both
these situations, assuming that the juvenile court has determined that
the new custodial arrangement adequately protects the minor, the
judge should rewrite the underlying family court order, file it in the
family court and dismiss the juvenile case.
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 361.2 and 362.4 are the
statutes which enable juvenile courts to make orders and thereafter
dismiss the dependency case."" Pursuant to these statutes, juvenile
courts can create a family law order redefining legal and physical
custody issues consistent with the child's needs, as determined by thejuvenile court. Once the order is created, the juvenile court can dis-
miss the case, cognizant that the newly created order will continue in
full force and effect in the family court case. In some situations, thejuvenile court can also add orders pertaining to restraints on conduct
by the non-custodial parent.8 "9
rary." Id. at 799, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 425 (citing In re Syson, 184 Cal. App. 2d 111, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 298 (1960)).
337. William T., 172 Cal. App. 3d at 799-800, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 425-26.
338. Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4 states:
When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been
adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court prior to the persons' attainment
of the age of 18 years, and either proceedings for the declaration of the nullity
or dissolution of the marriage of the minor's parents are pending in the superior
court of the same county, or an order has been entered with regard to the cus-
tody of that minor, the juvenile court on its own motion, may issue an order
directed to either of the parents enjoining any action specified in paragraph (2)
or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 4359 of the Civil Code or determining the
custody of or visitation with the child.
Any order issued pursuant to this section shall continue until modified or
terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court. The order of the juve-
nile court shall be filed in the proceeding for nullity or dissolution at the time
the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over the minor, and shall become a
part thereof.
CAL. WELt. & INST. CODE § 362.4 (West Supp. 1987). See also id. at § 361.2, presented, in
pertinent part, supra note 314.
339. See supra notes 319-34 and accompanying text.
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For example, if a mother as custodial parent had severely
beaten a child and a dependency petition had been sustained, the
court might consider a dispositional placement with father. After
some supervision of the child, the court might find that father is
adequately protecting the minor and believe that juvenile court inter-
vention is no longer necessary. If the court dismissed the case, the
family court order awarding custody to mother would be in force. To
avoid this result, the court should make a new custodial order
awarding sole legal and physical custody to father and no visitation
or restricted visitation to mother. The court may add to the order
that mother is restrained from coming to the minor's home, school or
any other place the child frequents, depending on the facts. The or-
der could also restrain other forms of contact such as telephone calls.
This order should be filed with the family court, and the juvenile
case could be dismissed because the underlying family court order
would then provide the protection that the court deemed
necessary.840
The two statutes do not cover all situations that the juvenile
court judge or investigating worker might encounter. Section 361.2
focuses upon situations in which the minor has been removed from
the custodial parent and the non-custodial parent desires custody.
The court must place the minor with that parent unless such place-
ment would be detrimental to the child. 4" If the child is placed with
that parent, the court can award the parent legal and physical cus-
tody of the child, provide for reasonable visitation for the new non-
custodial parent and then terminate the juvenile court's jurisdiction
over the child. 4" Section 361.2 does not explain where the newly
created order should be filed upon termination of juvenile court
340. This was the kind of protection Jennifer P.'s mother secured before the jurisdic-
tional hearing in juvenile court. It is also the type of order the juvenile court suggested to no
avail that La Shonda B.'s father should receive.
341. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(a) (West Supp. 1987); CAL. R. CT. 1377
(West 1987).
342. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Complex problems
can arise in some situations described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2. If the
court has sustained a dependency petition, removed the child from the custodial parent, the
court may order reunification services with the original custodial parent. After six or twelve
months, the original custodial parent may urge the court to place the child back with him or
her. The new custodial parent will argue that the new home is a stable placement which
should receive preference over the original home. Statutory policies in the juvenile court favor-
ing reunification are in conflict with a number of child custody cases including In re Marriage
of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979); Burchard v. Garay, 42
Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1986); In re Marriage of Lewis, 186 Cal.
App. 3d 1482, 231 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1986). It is not clear which line or reasoning the juvenile
court judge should follow.
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jurisdiction if there is no pending domestic relations proceeding.
Without a family court proceeding in which to file the new order,
the new custodial parent may have difficulty proving his superior
custodial rights. As previously discussed, " ' the creation of a family
court custody file may be the solution.
The process described in Welfare and Institutions Code section
362.4 can only be utilized when an action for declaration of nullity,
petition for legal separation, or dissolution is pending between the
child's parents in the same county, or when an order has been en-
tered with regard to the custody of the minor." Thus, under the
facts of Kelvin M.3"" and La Shonda B.,3 46 no such order could have
been created in the juvenile court because neither case involved prior
family court proceedings. In these situations, the juvenile court
should first address the question of paternity where necessary for the
determination of the dependency action.3,4 7 Thereafter, the juvenile
court, in cooperation with the county clerk, should facilitate the crea-
tion of a file which contains the new custody order.3 '8
Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4 requires that the
paternity action be pending in the superior court of the same county
as the juvenile court proceeding. 4 9 This may create some difficulty
for parents who have an action pending in another county or state
but who wish to remain in the local county. Any foreign custody
order may be filed in the superior court where the child currently
resides. That order is adopted by the county as its own order as if it
had originated in that county. "
In Santa Clara County, the juvenile court typically makes a
custody order along with the paternity determination. That order is
labeled "custody order" and is sent to the County Clerk's office for
filing in a new file under the names of the parents. The custodial
parent now has a civil court order which remains in effect until the
child or parent dies, until the child is emancipated or until the order
is modified. A sample order is contained in Appendix A."5' Los
343. See supra notes 336-42 and accompanying text.
344. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362.4 (West Supp. 1987).
345. 77 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
346. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
347. In re Lisa D., 81 Cal. App. 3d 192, 146 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1978).
348. See Appendix A.
349. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362.4 (West Supp. 1987).
350. In re Marriage of Straeck, 156 Cal. App. 3d 617, 203 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1984). Thejuvenile court judge or investigating worker should insist that one parent secure any foreign
custody order so that it can be filed in the local jurisdiction.
351. This procedure may have been anticipated by CAL. R. CT. 1377(f)(1) (West
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Angeles County has promulgated a set of rules concerning the rela-
tionship between the family and juvenile courts. 5 2 A copy of these
rules is contained in Appendix B. Santa Clara County's draft of
rules relating to the management of child abuse cases that arise in
the family and juvenile courts is contained in Appendix C.
The establishment and utilization of an effective and efficient
procedure for creating a family court order in juvenile court and the
subsequent dismissal of juvenile court cases is an important develop-
ment for both the families involved and the agencies providing
services. Custodial parents no longer have agency personnel super-
vising them after it becomes unnecessary to do so. Moreover, agency
workers are able to reduce their caseloads, removing cases which
should or would be dismissed but for the existence of the transfer
mechanism described above.
F. Relationship Between the Two Courts - Which One has
Precedence?
Different problems arise when family and juvenile courts
attempt to assert jurisdiction over the same custody questions simul-
taneously. Often, the family and juvenile courts in the same county
are asked to rule upon the same allegations of abuse. Sometimes
these cases arise in the family court of one county and the juvenile
court of a different county.85
Which court should resolve the question of abuse? How should
the choice of courts be determined? Does it matter that one court has
already completed its deliberations and has ruled on this issue when
the other court is asked to exert its jurisdiction?
Two recent cases have addressed some of these issues. In In re
1987).
352. The Los Angeles County rules relate to the coordination and consolidation of child
custody proceedings which may appear in both courts simultaneously. The procedures seek to
avoid costly duplication of effort, delays in case resolution and increased expense to litigants
and the court system. The procedures include a mechanism for terminating juvenile court ju-
risdiction by entering an appropriate family court order. Recognizing that Welfare and
Institutions Code section 362.3 is adequate to cover all of the cases which might properly be
dismissed if a family court order were in place, the local rule encourages the creation of family
court orders in situations not covered by the statute.
The rules also provide for communication between the family law and juvenile depart-
ments whenever action is contemplated by one that might have an impact upon the other, such
as termination of jurisdiction or suspension of proceedings and institution of proceedings in the
other court.
353. If the two courts were in different states then the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act (UCCJA) would control. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5150-74 (West 1984).
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William T.,s  father and mother began a custody battle for their
daughter, Nicole, in April 1979 in the Stanislaus County family
court.3 55 In the dissolution proceedings, mother was granted custody
of Nicole with visitation rights to father. 56 In 1983 mother was
incarcerated for welfare fraud and father was granted temporary
custody by the family court.35 " At a modification hearing in July
1983, the court ordered joint custody with primary physical custody
to father.3 58 During that hearing, father made allegations that
mother had abused Nicole.35 9
In April 1984 the maternal grandmother sought visitation
rights.310 The visitation issue was joined with other issues and set for
a family court hearing on October 17, 1984.61
In the meantime father moved to Solano County. 62 He still be-
lieved that mother had abused Nicole and referred the matter to the
Solano County juvenile authorities.3 63 The Solano County authori-
ties filed a dependency petition on behalf of Nicole on August 23,
1984."" ' The detention hearing was held on August 24th, and a
guardian ad litem was appointed for Nicole. 65 The mother and
grandmother were ordered to have no contact with Nicole. 6
Between October 17th and 24th, the Stanislaus County family
court held a six day hearing on the pending custody issues.36 7 The
court noted that, "if proceedings in the Solano County find they havejurisdiction, at that time, the orders of this court would be super-
seded."3 68 The Stanislaus County family court ruled that mother and
grandmother should have limited visitation rights. 6 '
354. 172 Cal. App. 3d 790, 218 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1985).
355. Id. at 795, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22.
356. Id. at 795, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 795-96, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
359. Id. at 796, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
360. Id. at 797, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
361. Id. at 796, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
362. Id.
363. He had previously referred the matter to the Stanislaus County C.P.A., but theyhad refused to file a petition on Nicole's behalf. "These alleged acts had already been thor-
oughly investigated by the Stanislaus County Child Protective Services, and the result of its
investigation (recommendation that no action be taken) had been communicated to the SolanoCounty Child Protective Services." Id. at 804, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (Franson, J., concurring).
364. Id. at 796, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 797, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
368. Id. at 796, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
369. Id.
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On December 18, 1984, the Solano County juvenile court found
the 300(d) petition to be true and declared that Nicole was a depen-
dent child of the court.3 70 On January 17, 1985, the court placed
Nicole with her father, terminated all visitation with mother, and
permitted only supervised visits for grandmother in Solano
County.371
When grandmother attempted to pick up Nicole for visitation
pursuant to the Stanislaus County order, father refused, relying on
the Solano order. 37" Mother and grandmother brought father back
before the Stanislaus family court on a contempt citation. 873 At the
contempt hearing, father was found in contempt of court and ordered
to serve 15 days in jail. 74 The Stanislaus court refused to acknowl-
edge the orders of the Solano court, calling that proceeding an "end
run" designed to defeat the jurisdiction of the Stanislaus court.375
Father petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of habeas
corpus to nullify the contempt conviction. 7" The court of appeal
granted the writ and issued a stay of the proceedings.17 7 In its opin-
ion two justices found that the orders of the Solano juvenile court
superseded those of the Stanislaus family court and that the family
court orders were unenforceable in a contempt proceeding. 78 These
justices recognized that concurrent jurisdiction can exist between
family and juvenile courts in custody issues. They cited Welfare and
Institutions Code section 304.5, which reads in part:
The fact that a minor is a dependent of the juvenile court pur-
suant to section 300 shall not divest a superior court pursuant to
Section 4600 of the Civil Code, from hearing proceedings be-
tween two parents regarding the custody of a minor who is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court.3 79
One of the two courts must take precedence over the other, and the
majority opinion recognized that the juvenile court must prevail. 380
The special nature of juvenile court proceedings and the focus upon
protection of the child, make juvenile court orders paramount to
370. Id. at 797-98, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
371. Id. at 796, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
372. Id. at 797, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
373. Id. at 798, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
374. Id. at 795, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 4:22.
375. Id. at 804, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
376. Id. at 798, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
377. Id. at 803-04, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
378. Id. at 798-800, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423-25.
379. Id. at 799, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
380. Id. at 795, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
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family court orders. Family court orders which conflict or interfere
with proper orders of the juvenile court are deemed void. The major-
ity noted that there is a long line of authority holding that juvenile
orders take precedence over orders from all other branches of the
superior court.38 '
The third member of the panel, Justice Franson, joined in the
reversal but for different reasons. Justice Franson found that father's
reliance upon the Solano juvenile court order did not constitute will-
ful disobedience of the Stanislaus family court order. 82 Justice
Franson went on to disagree with the majority opinion. He perceived
father's actions as a final tactic by one who was not pleased with
family court developments. 8 ' Justice Franson pointed out that the
father had first gone to the Stanislaus County child protective agency
where the allegations were thoroughly investigated but no action was
taken. 8" That information was communicated to the Solano County
child protective agency investigator who took action only after fa-
ther's change of venue motion based upon "convenience of witness
and ends of justice" was denied. 85 Justice Franson stated that:
the traditional rules of comity [should be applicable] to the end
. . . where a custody (or visitation) dispute between parents is
pending in the superior court at the time a dependency petition
is filed in juvenile court, the latter court should defer to the
superior court's handling of these matters unless some compel-
ling reason is shown as to why the superior court cannot protect
the safety and best interests of the minor. No such showing was
made in the present case.' 86
In re Brendan P.187 addressed many of the issues raised in Wil-
liam T. In Brendan P. the child's parents separated in 1982, when
mother moved Brendan and his two siblings to California from Vir-
381. Courts have occasionally noted that juvenile court jurisdiction is paramount to any
other superior court orders even if the other court's jurisdiction arose before that of the juvenile
courts. See, e.g., Matt v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 2d 527, 531-33, 250 P.2d 739, 742-43(1952); Smith v. Smith, 31 Cal. App. 2d 272, 87 P.2d 863 (1939); In re Farley, 162 Cal. App.2d 474, 478, 328 P.2d 230, 232 (1958); In re Syson, 184 Cal. App. 2d 111, 117, 7 Cal. Rptr.298, 301-02 (1960); Slevats v. Feustal, 213 Cal. App. 2d 113, 117-18, 28 Cal. Rptr. 517, 519-20 (1963); In re Christina L., 118 Cal. App. 3d 737, 744-45, 173 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726 (1981).382. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 805, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (Franson, J., concurring).
383. He found that the father was not willful in his failure to obey the StanislausCounty orders since he was in good faith relying on the Solano County juvenile court orders.
Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 806, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (emphasis added).
387. 184 Cal. App. 3d 910, 230 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1986).
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ginia, alleging that father assaulted her and molested the children. 8 8
A long custody battle ensued with mother hiding Brendan and father
kidnapping him. 8' The mother initiated child custody proceedings
in 1982 in a San Diego family court. 9 ° Court orders for visitation
proved fruitless as mother was consistently uncooperative with those
orders."' 1
In October 1983, after a nine day custody trial, a family court
judge ordered joint custody to both parents and two days a week
visitation to father. " ' The judge found "no evidence that Brendan
was molested by [his father]." 39 There also was no finding that fa-
ther had molested Brendan's siblings.
8 94
The parents continued to fight over the visitation issue. On
April 2nd, the judge ordered a two day supervised visit for father,
and mother went into hiding with the child.3 95 A bench warrant was
issued from the family court for her arrest. 9 On April 27th, mother
turned herself in to the juvenile court.397 That court recalled the
warrants and referred the case for further family court proceedings
on April 30th.3 98 Further visitation orders were made and visitation
attempts were once again thwarted.399 On May 4th, apparently at
mother's request, a dependency petition was filed, alleging in part
that, because of the minor's age, he was in need of such care and
control:
On or about 5-3-84 the emotional atmosphere in the home, to
wit, including but not limited to the mother in being forced to
allow Brendan to visit his father, [Bernard], who has sexually
molested and physically abused Brendan's half-sibling [which
was] detrimental and harmful to the health and welfare of said
minor.400
The petition also recited the "mother having custody is requesting
the services of the Juvenile Court. "401
388. Id. at 912, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 912-13, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
393. Id. at 913, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. id.
400. id.
401. Id.
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Notice of the dependency proceedings was mailed to father on
May 7th, but he contended he never received it. He was handed a
copy on May 9th.402 At the jurisdictional hearing, the father and his
counsel took no part since the court noted that the petition was di-
rected "uniquely" to the mother.403 A dependency finding was made
on her admission to the allegations of the petition.404 Brendan was
placed in a foster home and subsequently returned to his mother's
care on May 24th. 40 ' The same visitation problems subsequently
continued to plague the family. 4 6
Father appealed the juvenile court's assumption of jurisdic-
tion. 407 First, father claimed he received inadequate notice of the
proceedings.408 Second, he alleged that resort to the juvenile court
was a transgression of basic rules governing situations of concurrent
or overlapping jurisdiction. 40 9
The appellate court reversed, finding that father received inade-
quate notice of the petition. 410 The court ruled that, even absent a
request, the trial court should have ordered a continuance for up to
seven days in order for father's counsel to acquaint himself with the
case, especially since father was treated as a non-participant by the
court." 1
The appellate court then turned to the jurisdictional issue and
held that the first court to assume and exercise jurisdiction acquires
exclusive jurisdiction unless the welfare of the child requires as-
sumption of control by another court.12 It held that "relitigation of
identical issues in both domestic forums is nowhere said to be
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 915, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 920, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
411. Id. at 915, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 722-23. The Brendan P. court did not comment on
the trial court's peculiar statement at the jurisdictional hearing that the father need not partici-
pate since the petition was uniquely directed towards the mother. Id. at 913, 230 Cal. Rptr. at
721. Obviously this statement is inaccurate. Why should the case be continued for a week, as a
matter of law, if the matter did not directly involve the father? The trial court seems to suggest
that the father is a spectator to a proceeding in which his conduct is being judged, his custodial
rights are at stake and the visitation order he gained in the family court is about to be super-
seded. Clearly, the father should have an opportunity to be heard and participate in the juris-
dictional hearing. If there is to be a hearing, he is uniquely involved.
412. Id. at 917, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
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permissible."4 "
The court distinguished William T. on its facts, pointing out
that the juvenile court in William T. assumed jurisdiction and made
its visitation order before the superior court hearing and order."4"
The William T. court did not address the question of whether the
abuse had been litigated in the family court, because the issues of res
judicata and collateral estoppel had not been properly raised by the
appealing party. Finally, the court held that there were different is-
sues before the two courts in William T.4" 5
The appellate court contrasted the facts in Brendan P., point-
ing out that the sole justification for invoking the juvenile court's
jurisdiction was dissatisfaction with the family court's order.41 Un-
like William T., where the child protection agencies were found to
"insulate the proceedings from self-interest and petty interferences
which can pervade parental custody disputes," the petition in
Brendan P. was prompted by the mother, "and the proceedings
were not insulated from that same self-interest.1
41 7
Together, William T. and Brendan P. raise a number of im-
portant questions concerning the relationship between family and
juvenile courts. Can a dissatisfied parent move freely from family to
juvenile court in order to circumvent the family court's rulings? If so,
what limitations should be placed on this procedure? Should the par-
ties requesting initiation of juvenile proceedings be required to notice
the family court or give notice to the juvenile court that family court
proceedings are pending? What can courts do to insure that a case
will be heard in the most appropriate forum and that judicial and
other resources will be conserved.
The answer to these questions can be derived by reference to
the previous description of how child abuse allegations should be
managed.4 1 8 Of particular importance is that each court knows what
the other proposes to do, that they stay in close contact and cooperate
with one another.
The investigating worker in juvenile court is in the best position
to decide whether juvenile court jurisdiction is necessary for the
child's protection. Any disagreement with that investigator's determi-
nation should be appealed through the existing statutory
413. Id.
414. Id. at 918, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 920, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
417. Id. at 919, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
418. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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framework419 if the case is not petitioned or contested in the juvenile
court. Investigating workers should respect a decision not to inter-
vene that is made by other workers in the same or a different juris-
diction. If new facts are discovered, the matter should be referred
back to the original jurisdiction unless a child protection emergency
exists.42 If the litigants and courts in William T. or Brendan P.
had followed these principles, protracted and unnecessary proceed-
ings would have been avoided.
In William T., the Solano County action never should have
been initiated. The father, initially sought Stanislaus County juve-
nile court intervention, but the investigating worker decided that
intervention was unnecessary and that the family court could ade-
quately protect his daughter, Nicole.4 ' Father could have appealed
that decision and received a judicial response to his claim that Nicole
needed the protection of the juvenile court. Unless there were
allegations of subsequent abusive behavior, the Solano County inves-
tigating worker should have declined to intervene.
The orders of the two courts differed with respect to Nicole's
contact with her mother or her grandmother. The Stanislaus court
ordered grandmother to supervise visits with mother and for grand-
mother to have unsupervised visitation rights.422 Solano County
ordered no contact with mother and only supervised visits for grand-
mother in Solano County.423 These decisions reflect different views
on the same facts. Based upon the facts in the opinions it is impossi-
ble to determine which court is correct. Without explanation from
the Solano County juvenile court as to the necessity of additional
protection beyond the Stanislaus County family court order, the
Stanislaus County order should prevail.
In Brendan P. it appears that, from the outset, the family court
was ill-suited to control the warfare between the parents. This is
surely an extraordinary case in which the family court should have
considered asking the juvenile court for assistance based upon family
conflict and emotional abuse to the child. Brendan's parents resisted
the efforts of every court to reduce family conflict and provide a plan
for parental custody sharing. Each parent was reported to be kid-
napping and secreting Brendan; visitation had been thwarted; sexual
419. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 329, 330, 331 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).420. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5152(1)(c) (West 1983), for the UCCJA's definition of a
child protection emergency.
421. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
422. Id. at 797, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
423. Id. at 796, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
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abuse of Brendan was alleged."2' It is highly likely that all of this
was detrimental to Brendan.' 25
At a minimum, an attorney should have been appointed to re-
present Brendan. 4' The attorney could give the court an assessment
of the family dynamics before the trial, alert an investigating juvenile
court worker, and help the family court get better control of the
case.
427
Both the William T. and Brendan P. courts referred to the
principles of res judicata42' and collateral estoppel42 9 as means of
resolving the conflicting court orders. Notably, each court came to a
different conclusion about the applicability of these principles in
such cases. In William T. the court suggested that there was neither
an identity of parties nor issues, and that application of res judicata
principles in the area of child custody proceedings should be ap-
proached with caution.480 The Brendan P. court found that "reliti-
gation of identical issues in both domestic and juvenile forums is no-
where said to be permissible.'
43 1
The Brendan P. court distinguished William T. on the res
judicata issue in four ways. First, it noted that the juvenile court
assumed jurisdiction and made a visitation order before completion
of the domestic court's hearings. 4 2 Second, the court pointed out that
the issue of prior determination had not been raised on appeal in
William T.488 Third, it stated that the William T. court had found
424. Brendan P., 184 Cal. App. 3d at 912-13, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
425. Conflict between parents can have devastating consequences to minor children. See
WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980); Emery, Interparental Conflict
and the Children of Discord and Divorce, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD
PSYCHIATRY, September, 1985; Wallerstein, Changes in Parent-Child Relationships During
and After Divorce, PARENTAL INFLUENCES: IN HEALTH AND DISEASE (Anthony and Pollock
eds. 1986).
426. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4606 (West Supp. 1987). See Edwards, supra note 101.
427. The irony of Brendan P. is that in spite of the appellate court ruling, the case
remained in juvenile court for many months thereafter.
428. "The doctrine of res judicata gives conclusive affect to a former judgment in subse-
quent litigation involving the same controversy. It seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing
vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration."
7 WITKxN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Judgment § 188, at 621 (3d ed. 1985).
429. "A second action between the same parties on a different cause of action is not
precluded by a former judgment. But the first judgment 'operates as an estoppel or conclusive
adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in
the first action.' " Id. § 253, at 691.
430. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 802-03, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
431. 184 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
432. Id. at 918-19, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
433. Id.
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there was no identity of issues. 4 34 Finally, it noted that the William
T. court based its decision on public policy grounds which were ab-
sent in Brendan P.435
This reasoning is unpersuasive. The William T. juvenile court
did not assume jurisdiction until after the family court trial.4 36 It is
not clear whether the prior determination issue was raised in Wil-
liam T., but even if it had been properly preserved on appeal, the
appellate court indicated this issue would have been rejected.4 37 It is
difficult to understand why the William T. court found no identity of
issues while the Brendan P. court found identity since each was try-
ing the child abuse allegations in two separate courts. Finally, how
the Brendan P. court concluded that the investigating officer in Wil-
liam T. provided some insulation from "self interest and petty
interferences," while the officer in Brendan P. provided no such in-
sulation, is speculation. Neither recitation provides a glimpse of the
investigator's motivation or of the exchange between the investigator
and the parent seeking assistance.
Reference to the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel
is not appropriate for child abuse allegations in any case. These are
technical, legal principles based upon concerns regarding forum
shopping and wasting judicial resources. They reflect important poli-
cies, but those policies include only some of the factors that the
family and juvenile courts consider in child abuse cases. 43 8 Child
protection is the basis of juvenile court intervention. If juvenile courtjurisdiction is necessary in order to protect a child,'4 39 the court
should intervene irrespective of the doctrines of res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel.
The family and juvenile courts need to develop a protocol for
the management of cases involving child abuse allegations over which
both courts might assert jurisdiction. The courts and the persons or
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. The jurisdictional hearing was held on December 18, 1984. The custody trial washeld for six days between October 17 and October 24, 1984. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 795, 218 Cal.
Rptr. at 421-22.
437. Id.
438. For an example of the use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a criminal casebased upon a dependency finding, see Lockwood v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 667, 206
Cal. Rptr. 785 (1984).
439. Justice Franson suggested a similar criteria: "the latter court should defer to the
superior court's handling of these matters unless some compelling reason is shown as to why
the superior court cannot protect the safety and best interests of the minor." In re William T.,172 Cal. App. 3d at 805, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (Franson, J., concurring). See also Emerich v.
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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agencies serving them, must understand the strengths and weak-
nesses of both the family and juvenile court systems. Lines of
communication must be developed between the two courts. Without
this type of communication, William T. and Brendan P. situations,
with courts ignorant of or indifferent to each other's actions, are in-
evitable. These situations lead to forum shopping and wasted re-
sources for the parties and the courts, all to the detriment of the
child.44°
V. CONCLUSION
The juvenile and family courts were created for different rea-
sons and perform different tasks. Certain kinds of cases, such as
those involving child abuse allegations, may arise in either or both
courts. When deciding which court should hear child abuse allega-
tions, the differences between the family and juvenile courts should
be considered. The courts must not assume that a case belongs in one
court just because it started there. Child abuse allegations should
normally be heard in the juvenile courts.
The courts must establish procedures for deciding whether a
440. The following suggestions address the ways in which the family and juvenile courts
can work more effectively together in the management of custody cases involving child abuse
allegations.
1. Family Court Services staff members must understand and comply with the
mandatory reporting law.
2. The family and juvenile courts should work together to develop a protocol
for the handling of child abuse cases.
3. The protocol should be written and reviewed regularly at meetings between
the principle participants in the two courts. The protocol should include the
development of time lines by which one court or investigator will normally com-
plete work necessary for the other court to commence or resume proceedings.
4. Family Court Services and Child Protective Agencies should have conjoint
training in the detection and management of cases involving child abuse
allegations.
5. The training should include explanation of the duties and powers of all the
agencies involved.
6. The family and juvenile courts should develop local rules for the sharing of
information important for the work of each of the courts.
7. Judges, attorneys, Family Court Services staff, Child Protective Agency
workers and others working in the legal system serving children should be en-
couraged to remain within the system for at least two years and preferably
longer. The longer a participant remains within the system the greater his/her
expertise.
8. Child Advocates should be utilized in both courts in any case in which the
needs of the child require it.
Many of these recommendations are developed more fully in Theonnes & Pearson, supra
note I (available at the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Research Unit, 1720
Emerson Street, Denver, Colorado 80218).
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case involving child abuse allegations should be heard in juvenile or
family court. This process should involve identifying and convening
the critical participants in both court systems. The process of deter-
mining which court should proceed and how the courts will
coordinate with each other will help prevent the confusion and con-
flict created by such cases as William T. and Brendan P.
It is important to afford juvenile courts the ability to dismiss
cases with the assurance that the underlying family court order will
provide protection for the child. Some legislative changes are neces-
sary to cover all the situations faced by the juvenile court.
When child protection is the issue, the courts should be
prepared to work together to insure that adequate resources are
available to protect the child. In most cases this means the juvenile
court should have an opportunity to decide if it will intervene. If it
chooses not to intervene, the family court must use all of its resources
to meet the child's needs. The family court should also be prepared
to turn to the juvenile court for help in extraordinary cases in which
the parties are in such conflict that the child is seriously suffering.
The family and juvenile courts are necessary parts of the legal
system which both provides parents a forum to litigate their differ-
ences at the time they separate, and protects the child from parental
abuse. These two courts, however, must be sensitive to the strengths
and weaknesses of each court system and must be prepared to work
with one another when a case arises which could be heard in either
forum.
19871
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE ORDER
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
) ) Civil Case #
) Civil Case )) ) Petition #) )
) Juvenile )
) Case )
) ) ORDER
This matter came for Hearing on
as a result of a regularly scheduled Six-Month Review. The Court,
having read and considered the evidence, including the Supplemental
Court Report for Six-Month Review and Permanency Hearing
dated and the recommendations contained therein,
hereby makes the following Orders:
1) is the father of the minor
2) Legal and physical custody of the minor child
is awarded to (father/mother)
3) Visitation is granted to (name of other parent), the
minor's (natural mother/father, etc.), as follows:
a) Frequency, e.g. Alternate Saturdays beginning
(month, day, year)
b) Other restrictions if applicable.
4) Other orders: e.g. Grandparent visitation, re-
straining orders, etc.
5) This Order shall be filed with the Family, or other
Civil Court, Case # , and shall super-
sede all existing custody orders regarding said minor.
6) The Order of issued by the Juvenile
Court (Petition - ) finding the above
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minor a Dependent Child of the Court is hereby va-
cated and the case is hereby dismissed.
The above Order is being made pursuant to the authority vested
in the Juvenile Court by Welfare and Institutions Code, section
362.4. If either party to the Family Court Case moves to modify this
order in a Civil Court, the Juvenile Court may be contacted to deter-
mine the reasons for the original dependency finding, the reasons for
this termination order, and any other relevant information.
DATE JUDGE OF THE JUVENILE COURT
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APPENDIX B
LOS ANGELES COUNTY PROCEDURES FOR COORDI-
NATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF MULTIPLE CHILD
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS PENDING IN BOTH FAMILY
LAW DEPARTMENT AND DEPENDENCY COURT
I. Purpose:
The procedures described by this policy permits [sic] imple-
mentation of Local Rule 307 which states:
"The best interests of the child, litigants and court are
promoted by early identification and coordination of cus-
tody proceedings involving the same child. To that end, all
departments involved in custody issues shall cooperate to
eliminate multiple custody proceedings. Whenever possi-
ble, such proceedings shall be handled in one department
and consolidated for purposes of trial."
The procedures seek to alleviate problems created by:
1. Involvement of both the Family Law Department and De-
pendency Court in instances where a dependency petition
is filed during the course of a pending child custody action;
2. Inability of the Dependency Court to terminate court ju-
risdiction of a child placed with a nonoffending parent due
to that parent's failure or financial inability to establish
paternity or initiate a child custody proceeding in the
Family Law Department.
II. Determination of More Appropriate Forum for Consideration
of Pending Child Dependency Issues While a Child Custody
Proceeding is Pending in the Family Law Department
1. If the Family Law Department learns that the filing of a
dependency petition is contemplated or has occurred, the
Family Law Department Supervising Judge will advise
the Dependency Court Supervising Judge. Similarly, if at
any stage of the child dependency proceeding the Depen-
dency Court learns that a child custody proceeding is
pending in the Family Law Department, the Dependency
Court Supervising Judge will advise the Family Law De-
partment Supervising Judge regarding the initiation of the
dependency proceeding.
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2. The two supervising judges will confer about the case, de-
termine whether the case should be coordinated and the
hearings consolidated and, if so, decide which court offers
the more appropriate forum for litigating the child custody
and dependency issues.
3. In determining which court offers the more appropriate
forum for litigating the child custody and dependency is-
sues, the two judges are to consider the following factors:
a. Familiarity of respective courts with the parties as
well as the custody and visitation issues;
b. Stage of the proceedings in the respective courts;
c. Extent to which custody and visitation represent all
or only a portion of the issues considered by the Fam-
ily Law Department; and
d. Availability of County Counsel and Department of
Children's Services if the Family Law Department is
selected as the more appropriate forum.
4. If the supervising judges determine that the best interests
of the child, convenience to litigants and court efficiency
dictate coordination of the two cases and consolidation of
hearings for purposes of trial, the matters will be coordi-
nated/consolidated by agreement of the judges and
transferred to the more appropriate court for further
proceedings.
5. If the supervising judges are unable to reach agreement
regarding the appropriate forum, the question will be re-
solved by the Superior Court Presiding Judge and the Ju-
venile Court Presiding Judge.
6. Where a determination is made to coordinate cases and
consolidate hearings, the judicial officer assigned to hear
the matter will sit as both a family law and juvenile court
judge and is empowered to make appropriate orders in
both cases.
III. Determination of More Appropriation Forum for Deciding
Paternity and Custody Issues Involving Children Already
under Superior Court Jurisdiction
The following procedure is provided where initiation of a child
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custody or paternity action in the Family Law Department
will enable the Dependency Court to terminate jurisdiction
over the child.
1. If the Dependency Court determines that an award of cus-
tody in favor of the nonoffending parent with whom a
child has been placed or the establishment of that parent's
paternity is in a child's best interest and will enable the
Dependency Court to terminate dependency status, the
Dependency Court will authorize the nonoffending parent
to initiate a paternity or child custody action in the Family
Law Department.
a. If the Dependency Court further determines that the
nonoffending parent does not possess the financial
ability to retain counsel to initiate the authorized
family law action, the Dependency Court has the dis-
cretion, pursuant to WIC section 317 to appoint
counsel to assist the nonoffending parent in initiating
an appropriate Family Law Department proceeding;
b. A copy of the minute order authorizing the initiation
of a paternity or child custody action will be for-
warded by the Dependency Court to the Family Law
Department Supervising Judge.
2. After the nonoffending parent files a paternity or child
custody action in the Family Law Department, counsel for
the parent will file a motion in the Family Law Depart-
ment to coordinate cases and consolidate proceedings.
3. When a motion to coordinate/consolidate is filed, the
Family Law Department Supervising Judge will contact
the Dependency Court Supervising Judge. The two judges
will determine whether the family law and child depen-
dency cases should be coordinated and the hearings consol-
idated and, if so, decide which court offers the more ap-
propriate forum for litigating the paternity, child custody
and dependency issues.
4. In determining which court offers the more appropriate
forum for litigating the issues, the two supervising judges
are to consider the following factors:
a. Familiarity of the respective courts with the parties
and issues in the case;
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b. Stage of proceedings in the respective courts;
c. Ekttent to which paternity, custody and visitation re-
present all or only a portion of the issues in the Fam-
ily Law Department; and
d. Availability of County Counsel and Department of
Children's Services if the Family Law Department is
selected as the more appropriate forum.
5. If the supervising judges determine that the best interests
of the child, convenience to litigants and court efficiency
dictate coordination of the two cases and consolidation of
hearings, the matters will be coordinated/consolidated by
agreement of the judges and transferred to the more ap-
propriate court for further proceedings.
6. If the supervising judges are unable to reach agreement
regarding the appropriate forum, the issue will be resolved
by the Superior Court Presiding Judge and the Juvenile
Court Presiding Judge.
7. Where a determination is made to coordinate cases and
consolidate hearings in a single court, the judicial officer
assigned to hear the matter will sit as both a family law
and juvenile court judge and is empowered to make appro-
priate orders in both cases. If paternity is established and/
or a child custody award is made in those proceedings, the
child's dependency status will be terminated.
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APPENDIX C
DRAFT PROTOCOL
SANTA CLARA COUNTY
FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT
MANAGEMENT OF CHILD ABUSE CASES
POLICY
It is the policy of the Superior Court to identify and coordinate
custody proceedings involving the same child which may appear in
multiple legal settings. To this end the court and the agencies serving
the court in the resolution of custody and child protective proceed-
ings shall cooperate to eliminate multiple custody proceedings.
1. If during the pendency of a family law proceeding a child
abuse allegation is made against one of the child's parents, the
Family Court Services staff member or other mediator or
evaluator shall first determine whether the allegation must be
reported to a child protective agency pursuant to Penal Code
Section 11166.
2. If the family court services staff member or other mediator or
evaluator does not report the allegation pursuant to Penal Code
Section 11166, any other person may do so.
3. When the child protective agency receives a report of suspected
child abuse in a custody proceeding it shall investigate pursuant
to Welfare & Institutions Code Section 16501 et seq. The deci-
sion to intervene or take no action shall be made as soon as
possible.
4. If there is no intervention by the child protective agency, any
person may apply to the probation officer pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 329. In that application the affi-
ant shall give notice and identifying information of any pending
family law proceeding.
5. The probation officer shall respond to the application as soon
as possible and in no event later than 3 weeks after the submis-
sion of the application. (Welfare and Institutions Code Section
329)
6. If the child protective agency investigator decides to take no
formal action except to monitor the Family Court case to en-
sure that the child is adequately protected in Family Court, the
investigator shall inform the Family Court Services staff mem-
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ber and any reporting party of his/her findings and any advice
given to the parents.
7. If the probation officer decides not to initiate proceedings, the
applicant may apply to the Juvenile Court to review the deci-
sion of the probation officer pursuant to Welfare and Institu-
tions Code Section 331.
The party reporting any child abuse or making application for
Juvenile Court intervention shall indicate whether there are
pending any family law or other civil proceedings involving the
custody, visitation, care or control of the child.
The Juvenile Court shall rule on the application as soon as
possible and in no event later than 30 days after receipt of the
application.
8. After a child abuse report has been made pursuant to Penal
Code Section 11165 et seq. and before the decision whether to
intervene has been made by the child protective agency there
shall be no further proceedings in the Family Court without
first giving notice of the proceedings to the child protective
agency.
9. If a dependency petition is filed on behalf of the minor, any
Family Court custody and visitation proceedings shall be sus-
pended. The Family Court shall resume custody or visitation
litigation only after written authorization is received from the
Juvenile Court.
10. If the parents reach an informal agreement pursuant to Wel-
fare and Institutions Code Section 330, a copy shall be sent
immediately to the reporting party and Family Court Services.
CREATION OF A FAMILY COURT ORDER IN
JUVENILE COURT
1. Whenever any interested party believes that Juvenile Court in-
tervention on behalf of a child is no longer necessary, applica-
tion may be made to the Juvenile Court pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 378 or at any regularly scheduled
parte hearing to have the case dismissed. Thereafter any future
litigation relating to the custody, visitation and control of the
child shall be heard in the Family Court or other appropriate
Superior Court Civil Department.
2. If the Juvenile Court determines that jurisdiction or [sic] the
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Juvenile Court is no longer necessary for the protection of the
child, the court may create a custodial order consistent with the
needs of the child and thereafter dismiss the juvenile petition
and case (Welfare & Institutions Code Section 361.2, 362.4).
[See Appendix A].
3. In making this order the court (a) shall include any paternity
determination if one has been made in the Juvenile Court; (b)
shall include a visitation plan unless the court finds that it
would be detrimental to the best interests of the child (Civil
Code Sections 4600, 4601 and Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 361.2.); (c) may include any appropriate orders re-
straining conduct pursuant to Civil Code Section 4359.
4. The court order shall be filed in the Juvenile Court file and in
any existing family or other civil court file.
5. If no court file exists in the Family Court or other Superior
Court division or in any other jurisdiction, the county clerk
shall create a file under the names of the child's parents. The
file shall contain a copy of the Juvenile Court order. The party
awarded primary custody of the child (or both parties if there
is a joint custody order) shall pay a filing fee unless that party
qualifies for a waiver of such fees.
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